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Products Liability, Workmen's Compensation and
the Industrial Accidentt
Caroline Mitchell*
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT: THE INJURED WORKMAN AND
COMPENSATION MECHANISMS
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed an
industrial revolution that was to reshape the very structure of so-
ciety itself. With the advent of industrialization came the evolution
of a system of tort liability whereby those who had suffered injury
due to the unreasonable acts of another could recover suitable com-
pensation.' One primary focus of this tort system, concerned as it
was with the allocation of losses resulting from socially unreasona-
ble conduct, was the definition of the liability of an employer to a
workman injured in the course of his employment.
A. The Common Law System of Compensation
An employer at common law was held to several narrowly defined
duties of care for the protection of his workers.' An employer had to
use reasonable care in providing both a safe place to work and
adequate tools and appliances.' He had a duty to warn his servants
t This article was written under the auspices of a study sponsored by the National Science
Foundation from a grant (NSF Grant No. GI-34857) to Carnegie-Mellon University; this
study is entitled "Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology."
* B.S. Ch.E., University of Pittsburgh (1968); J.D., Duquesne University School of Law
(1973); Research Engineer and Lecturer, Mechanical Engineering and Public Affairs Pro-
gram, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
1. Somewhere around the year 1825, negligence began to emerge out of the action on the
case, and to be recognized as a separate basis of tort liability, independent of other causes of
action. Its use coincided to a remarkable degree with the industrial revolution in England.
It was probably stimulated a great deal by the enormous increase of industrial machi-
nery in general and by the invention of railways in particular. At that time, railways
were notable neither for speed nor safety. They killed any object from a Minister of
State to a cow, and this naturally reacted upon the law.
W. PROSSER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON Tors 163 (4th ed. 1967), citing P. WINFIELD, LAW OF
TORT 404 (5th ed. 1950).
2. See cases collected in W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 80 nn.91-95, at
526-27 (4th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
3. Id. nn.91-92, at 526.
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of those dangers with which they might conceivably be unac-
quainted and to promulgate and enforce rules in furtherance of
employee safety.' An employer also had an obligation to provide a
suitable number of fellow servants,5 although he was not held liable
for the negligent conduct of an employee's fellow workers.'
As an uncontrovertible incidbnt of the employment contract, an
employee was held to have relieved his employer of liability for most
work-related hazards not covered by the employer's common law
duties. Despite the lack of any conscious, voluntary choice on the
part of an employee to subject himself to an occupational hazard,
he had no right to collect for an injury arising from dangers normally
incident to his employment. An employee, by his decision to remain
employed despite knowledge of industrial hazards, implicitly re-
lieved his employer of the common law obligations to safeguard
against such hazards.7
Even when an employee's injury was clearly related to dereliction
of his employer's common law duty, there was no guarantee of com-
pensation. The employee might find his recovery barred by the doc-
trine of contributory negligence,' whereby his own negligence,
however slight, destroyed his right to recover compensation from the
more-negligent employer. Or, the employee's cause of action for his
employer's violation of a duty could be defeated by the employer's
defense of "voluntary assumption of the risk."9 Under this doctrine,
an employee was held to have "consented" to any negligence on the
4. Id. nn.93, 95, at 526.
5. Id. n. 94, at 526.
6. The "fellow-servant rule" placed the burden of taking precautions against the negli-
gence of co-workers squarely on the employee. The employer was held to no duty to protect
his servants against the unreasonable acts of one another, since the servants were thought to
be in a much better position to protect themselves. C. LABATT, MASTER AND SERVANT 473
(1904). The prospect of liability to a fellow servant was intended to make each servant more
careful of the other's safety.
7. This relieving of liability could be by formal contract such as that in Conway v. Furst,
57 N.J.L. 645, 32 A. 380 (N.J. App. 1895). More often it rested upon implied consent. See
Note, 47 VA. L. REV. 1444 (1961).
8. Contributory negligence bars plaintiff's recovery on the theory that- defendant's negli-
gent act was not the proximate cause of the injury. Contributory negligence disentitles a
worker to sue, and the law will not investigate further to determine the employer's relative
fault. See Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARv. L. REV. 233 (1908); Warren, Volenti
Non Fit Injuria in Actions of Negligence, 8 HARv. L. REV. 457, 459 (1895).
9. See, e.g., Priestley v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837), a classic master-servant
confrontation case where voluntary assumption of the risk decided the liability issue in favor
of the employer.
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part of his employer-even that arising from breach of common law
duties-by choosing to remain employed.' 0
The hardship upon the workman was readily apparent. Even in
cases where he had not been contributorily negligent, an employee
had to overcome the presumption that he had impliedly consented
to the injury by demonstrating that the employer had behaved will-
fully or wantonly" or had created false illusions of safety'2 upon
which the employee had relied. The three wicked sisters of the
common law-the fellow-servant rule, contributory negligence, and
voluntary assumption of the risk-effectively operated to shift the
ultimate burden of a work-related injury from the employer to the
party least able to bear the loss-the injured workman.
B. The Legislative Effort: A System of Compensation for the
Workman
The proliferation of uncompensated occupational injuries man-
dated nothing short of a comprehensive solution.' 3 The reallocation
of the burden of employee injury from the employee to the enter-
prise required a system of loss distribution whereby the economic
burdens of such injury would be treated as a fixed cost of doing
10. See, e.g., Brown v. Lennane, 155 Mich. 686, 118 N.W. 581 (1908); Manks v. Moore,
108 Minn. 284, 122 N.W. 5 (1909); Clarke v. Holmes, 158 Eng. Rep. 751 (Ex. 1862). See also
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 423 (1923); 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 1-2.20, at 1-7 (1952) [hereinafter cited as LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION]; Larson, The Legal Aspects of Causation in Workmen's Compensation, 8
RUT. L. REV. 423 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Larson, Legal Aspects]; Comment, Workmen's
Compensation and Employer Suability: The Dual Capacity Doctrine, 5 ST. MARY'S L. REV.
818, 819 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Dual Capacity].
11. Willful intent to injure was not one of the risks to which an employee was deemed to
have given his implied consent. When the workmen's compensation statutes were formulated.
several provided for the resurrection of an employee's right to a suit at common law for an
employer's willful misconduct. The misconduct had to be outrageous before the extraneous
right was thought to exist, however. See, e.g., Fowler v. Southern Wire & Iron, Inc., 104 Ga.
App. 401, 122 S.E.2d 157 (1961), rev'd, 217 Ga. 727, 124 S.E.2d 738 (1962), where the plaintiff-
employee alleged the right to a suit at common law for the employer's willful misconduct in
directing him to work in an acid vat with his bare hands as a punishment for refusing to
divulge the names of union organizers. The misconduct was not deemed severe enough to
overcome the statutory provision of exclusive remedy.
12. See cases collected in PROSSER, supra note 2, § 80, nn.14, 15 at 528.
13. Several states studied the problem; the estimated percentages of uncompensated
industrial injuries were shockingly high. The New York Employer's Liability Commission's
First Report in 1910 estimated the figure to be 87 percent. 1 FIRST REPORT OF THE NEW YORK
EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY COMMISSION 25 (1910). Ohio's commission reported 94 percent. REPORT
OF THE OHIO EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY COMMISSION XXXV (1911).
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business and assimilated into the general costs of production.' 4 "The
cost of the product must bear the blood of the workman."" At the
same time, the distribution mechanism would have to strike a just
balance between the workman, who had a right to some fair com-
pensation for tortious conduct, and the employer, who had a right
to pay only his fair share of work-related losses.'"
The solution settled upon was "workmen's compensation"-a
system of no-fault compensation whereby the employer would take
out insurance coverage which would pay limited amounts to a
worker who had sustained a "work-related" injury. No proof of em-
ployer negligence would be required; the payment of compensation
would be determined by an evaluation of the employee's status at
the time of his injury rather than an evaluation of the employer's
fault. The existence of an employer-employee relationship, in the
course of which a work-related injury was sustained, thus became
the threshold determinant for payment of a workmen's compensa-
tion award.'"
For the employee, the enactment of workmen's compensation
statutes by the states" was a welcome improvement over the
private-law system which required an employee to affirmatively
prove negligence on the part of his employer in order to recover. The
long delays inherent in the private lawsuit as the mechanism for
employee compensation were all but eliminated by the insurance-
claim provisions of the new statutes. These statutes also eliminated
the three defenses-the fellow-servant rule, contributory negligence,
and voluntary assumption of the risk-which had so effectively
14. See Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547 (2d Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 235
U.S. 705 (1915). See also Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation
Acts, 25 HAMv. L. REV. 328 (1912) [hereinafter cited as Bohlen]; Walton, Workmen's Com-
pensation and the Theory of Professional Risk, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 36 (1911) [hereinafter cited
as Walton].
15. Prosser attributes his poetic description to Lloyd George. See PROSSER, supra note 2,
§ 80 n.37, at 530.
16. See generally Bohlen, supra note 14; Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's
Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Larson, Nature and
Origins]; Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensation for Industrial Accidents Here
and Abroad, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 531 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Riesenfeld]; Walton, supra
note 14.
17. See generally A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 1-7, passim (3d ed.
1970); I. SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 6 (2d ed. 1932).
18. See generally Bohlen, supra note 14; Larson, Nature and Origins, supra note 16;
Riesenfeld, supra note 16; Walton, supra note 14.
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barred an employee's recovery under negligence theories, since de-
gree of fault was no longer at issue.'9
In return for the speedy adjudication of claims and diminished
proof of eligibility under the workmen's compensation statutes, the
employee was forced to waive his common law right to sue the
employer in tort for work-related injuries. A provision that work-
men's compensation was to be the "exclusive remedy"' " for work-
related injuries was incorporated in all of the state statutes.2' Addi-
tionally, a ceiling was placed on the amount recoverable by the
injured employee by fixing the maximum recovery as a percentage
of the average wage statewide, the percentage to be based on the
degree of disability-an amount usually considerably less than a
jury would have awarded as damages." The employee thus traded
the possibility of a generous award after litigation for the assured
recovery of a smaller amount under a workmen's compensation stat-
ute. The employer accepted the financial burden of a broadened
statutory liability without proof of fault in exchange for a release
from all common law tort obligations of due care.2 3
The workmen's compensation statutes in theory provide several
19. This result is logical in a system based on the employee's status rather than employer
fault. However, cases collected in PROSSER, supra note 2, § 80 at 533 n.64 question the logic
of this result.
20. The exclusive remedy provision of workmen's compensation statutes is generally
phrased as follows: "Nor shall any other action be brought against the employer ... by an
employee . . . or . . . by anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages . . . on account of
such injury or death .... " See, e.g., N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1965).
21. All state statutes provide for the exclusivity of the workmen's compensation remedy.
See generally 2 LARaSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 10, § 65.10 at 135. As to the
Pennsylvania workmen's compensation statute see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 1-1603 (1952).
See also Hartwell v. Allied Chem. Corp., 457 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1972); Watkins v. National
Elec. Prod. Corp., 69 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 165 F.2d 980 (3d Cir. 1947).
22. This was thought to be a fair compromise for the employee's right to compensation
without proof of fault. All states adopted some form of schedules defining compensation
rights. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 306 (1952). The Pennsylvania statute, since 1972,
has provided $60 per week for total disability and $45 per week for permanent partial disabil-
ity. See also Johnson, Can Our State Workmen's Compensation System Survive?, 3 FORUM
265, 269 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Johnson].
23. The majority of state's workmen's compensation acts were mandatory for certain
types of employment. An employer's affirmative disavowal of coverage under the act restored
to the employee the right to a lawsuit against the employer for breach of any common law
duty. See, e.g., Liberato v. Roger & Herr, 28 Pa. Dist. 268, 22 Dauph. 1 (C.P. 1919); Kaplan
v. Haney, Kuttner & Raab, 27 Pa. Dist. 535 (C.P. Phila. Co. 1918). This penalty for non-
election was widely accepted as a mechanism for encouraging employer participation.
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practical advantages over the common-law system of recovery. The
claim-recovery process, similar to that of private insurance con-
tracts, avoids the cost and delay characteristic of the private lawsuit
recovery mechanism. The funding for the loss-distribution mecha-
nism, accomplished by employers' periodic payments of premiums
into a common fund from which compensation is paid, allows the
cost of employee injuries to be figured into the ultimate cost of the
product. The elimination of the possibility of a tort suit against an
employer diminishes the friction which would normally occur be-
tween the adversary parties involved in a traditional lawsuit. Since
the amount of the premium paid by the employer is related to the
dollar value of the claims paid to his employees, the employer has,
at least theoretically, a strong interest in providing a safe working
environment. Moreover, the exclusiveness of the remedy against the
employer generally does not preclude an employee's cause of action
against a third party who in some way legally contributes to the
employee's injury.
C. Adequacy of the System: A Criticism
The loss distribution mechanism established under workmen's
compensation in practice has been accused of falling far short of its
theoretical goals.24 The limited-recovery compensation schedules,
even as recently amended, deliberately do not include amounts that
would be payable under tort law for pain and suffering or for impair-
ment of earning capacity.25 The schedules provide compensation for
lost earnings at a fixed maximum rate tied to the average weekly
wage, with no variation allowed even when a worker's weekly wage
substantially exceeds the scheduled amounts. 6 In the case of de-
24. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 22.
25. These elements, normally recoverable for a loss occasioned by another's tortious con-
duct, were excluded in order to keep the compensation schedules within reasonable limits.
26. The benefits under workmen's compensation have been increased over time to reflect
changing economic conditions. E.g., Act of June 2, 1915, No. 338, [1915] Laws of Pa. 736,
provided a maximum of $15 per week for total disability; Act of June 4, 1937, No. 323, [1937]
Laws of Pa. 1552, increased this to $18 per week; Act of May 14, 1949, No. 409, [1949] Laws
of Pa. 1369, increased this to $25 per week; Act of Jan. 2, 1952, No. 481, [1952] Laws of Pa.
1803, increased this to $30 per week; Act of March 29, 1972, No. 61, [19721 Laws of Pa. 159,
raised the limit to $60 per week. The Report of the National Commission on State Workmen's
Compensation Laws concluded that the state compensation laws were neither adequate nor
equitable. See THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAWS 126 (1972).
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bilitating injury, the amount recoverable under workmen's com-
pensation is at best a meager fraction of the amount required to
"make the injured party whole again."
One may readily see, upon reviewing the merits of the philosophy
that motivated the introduction of workmen's compensation, that
the remedy therein provided could not be and was never intended
to be a total restitution for damages. The partial restitution afforded
by statute seems generous when afforded to the employee whose
employer is not in any way legally at fault in precipitating a work-
related injury. In these situations, a loss uncompensable under tort
law nevertheless is partially paid for by the employer's insurance
fund, and part of the burden on the employee is distributed to the
enterprise. But in cases where the employer has actively contributed
to or caused the employee's harm by negligent conduct, the partial
compensation offered under statute as the employee's exclusive
remedy is inequitable, in addition to being less than adequate.
Much has been written in an attempt to balance the right of an
injured employee to fair compensation against an employer's right
to limit his exposure under an expanded system of absolute liability.
A return to a pure fault system where employer's and employee's
conduct would be tested for fault, and loss distribution made ac-
cordingly, would reopen the Pandora's box of problems which was
closed by the original workmen's compensation statutes. It seems
fair to ask the employee to absorb some loss by agreeing to partial
compensation where his injury is the unavoidable consequence of
lawful enterprise. 27 But when the employer's behavior toward his
employee is so reprehensible as to be characterizable as "moral
negligence," all notions of justice ask that the burden of the injury
fall more heavily on the employer than on his innocent employee.
In an attempt to balance the scales of justice, penalty statutes28
27. It has been suggested that it might be advisable to characterize certain types of
negligent acts as "moral negligence" so as to be able to censure truly reprehensible conduct.
"When liability was affixed" as a result of some unavoidable consequence of lawful enterprise,
the negligence was properly characterizable as "negligence without fault." A. EHRENZWEIG,
TRENDS TOWARD AN ENTERPRISE LIABILITY FOR INSURABLE Loss: NEGLIGENCE WiTHOuT FAULT 16,
61 (1951).
28. Few workmen's compensation statutes created any exception to the exclusive-remedy
provision of the statute by allowing additional suits against the employer. The employer could
be sued for willful conduct, such as assault. See Readinger v. Gottschall, 201 Pa. Super. 134,
191 A.2d 694 (1963). But willful conduct such as violation of a safety statute did not constitute
the sort of non-accidental injury for which a cause of action would lie. Evans v. Allentown
1976
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were enacted to provide sanctions against an employer whose negli-
gence was substantially greater than that which his employee could
reasonably be asked to tolerate. 9 Some of these statutes allow an
employee, whose injury would ordinarily be exclusively covered by
workmen's compensation, to elect whether to collect workmen's
compensation or to sue the employer at common law for wanton and
willful misconduct or intentional injury, which would have the po-
tential for providing a recovery for the entire loss the injured em-
ployee has suffered, rather than merely compensating for lost wages
as workmen's compensation would. Other penalty clauses provide
for a substantial percentage increase in workmen's compensation
benefits where an employer indulges in serious and willful miscon-
duct or violates a safety statute. Either of these two legislative
modifications tempers the harshness of the hitherto uncompensated
losses borne by an employee who suffers injury in the employ of a
grossly negligent employer. But even a 100 per cent increase over the
inadequate lost-earnings workmen's compensation restitution may
not make the seriously injured employee whole again.30
Portland Cement Co., 433 Pa. 595, 252 A.2d 646 (1969). Even if the employer's conduct
amounted to aggravated negligence and included such elements as knowingly permitting
hazardous work conditions or willfully ordering dangerous practices, no cause of action ex-
isted. See cases collected in 2A LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 10, §§ 68.10-
.23 passim.
29. Larson notes that a limited recognition of fault through the penalty clause may be
some solution to the inequity. The penalty gives an incentive to employers to observe safety
rules without thwarting the social risk distribution concepts by denying all recovery to the
employee or relieving the employer of nothing. 2A LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra
note 10, § 70.20 passim.
30. The majority of safety statutes fail to provide for any penalty, either by the employee
or by the state, against the employer who willfully refuses to obey the statute, even if his
conduct results in serious injury to persons in the class for whose protection the statute was
intended. See Evans v. Allentown Portland Cement Co., 433 Pa. 595, 252 A.2d 646 (1969).
The deterrent impact of such a statute cannot help but be minimal.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970), provides for
the assessment of fines against employers who violate certain safety provisions. For example,
under id. §§ 651, 652(a)(2), the employer's failure to provide a safety guard on a machine
subjects him to a penalty of $50. Gould-Mersereau Co., [1974-751 O.S.H.D. 19,474 (1975)
(Burroughs, Judge).
As an alternative to a statutorily-determined fine, seven states provide for a percent in-
crease in the benefits payable under workmen's compensation if the employer has violated a
state safety statute. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.120 (1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 342.105 (1962);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (Supp. 1975); OHIO CONST. art. II, § 35; S.C. CODE § 72-157 (1962);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-12 (1974); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.57 (1973). The percentage-increase
ranges from 10% (New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina) to 15% (Missouri, Utah,
Wisconsin), with a discretionary allowance of up to 50% in Ohio. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 85.16-
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A limited number of states permit suits against an employer by
an employee under the theory that an employer has an independent
obligation to his employee, for breach of which a common-law ac-
tion lies. Thus, an employee may sue his employer in a suit extra-
neous to the workmen's compensation remedy if the employer has
a "dual-capacity" with respect to the employee .3 The crux of the
issue is not so much "capacity" as "duality" of obligation to plain-
tiff. For example, if a doctor negligently treats a patient who hap-
pens to also be his employee, the employer is acting in an additional
"capacity" as physician. The employee has a separate cause of ac-
tion in tort based on the obligation of professional competence im-
posed upon the employer in his capacity as physician. This separate
action against the employer has been likened to a "third party ac-
tion," in recognition of the fact that an employee retains all rights
to sue third party tortfeasors irrespective of the existence of his
workmen's compensation remedy against his employer.
It is easy to justify the dual-capacity doctrine when the obligation
of the employer as "third party" is readily distinguishable from the'
obligation of which he is relieved under workmen's compensation.
For example, consider the case of an employer, owner of a laundro-
mat and a drugstore, whose drugstore clerk is injured on the laun-
dromat property while in the course of employment for the drug-
store.3 2 The obligation of the employer to his employee-to provide
safe working conditions in the drugstore for his clerk-is readily
separable from the obligation of a landowner to keep his premises
reasonably safe for the protection of business invitees. The allow-
ance of a common-law suit against the employer for negligent main-
tenance of business premises is not inconsistent with the exclusive-
remedy provisions of workmen's compensation. The action against
the employer in his dual capacity is founded upon a duty of care
external to the employer-employee relationship. Just as an em-
88.14 (1966) provides that if the employer has violated a safety statute, the employee's
workmen's compensation recovery, normally subject to a percent reduction for contributory
negligence on his part, cannot be reduced at all. The employee's violation of any one of a
number of regulations will bar or diminish his recovery under most workmen's compensation
statutes. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 26 § 270 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09 (1966); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19, § 2353(b) (1953) (failure to use safety devices); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 431
(1969); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 50-910 (1966) (violation of law); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1965);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-14 (1974) (failure to obey employer's rules).
31. See Comment, Dual Capacity, supra note 10.
32. See Hudson v. Allen, 11 Mich. App. 511, 161 N.W.2d 596 (1968).
1976
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ployee under workmen's compensation expressly retains his
common law right to sue negligent third parties, so should he retain
the right to sue if the third party is coincidentally his employer.
The dual-capacity doctrine has had limited acceptance and can-
not be relied upon to provide a common law cause of action even
where the employer's obligations are clearly separable. For example,
in Lewis v. Gardner Engineering Corp. ," plaintiff was the foreman
of a construction project managed by two joint-venture partners,
Gardner and San Ore Construction Company. Gardner was also the
designer and manufacturer of various pieces of equipment used on
the job site. Plaintiff was injured when a hoisting clamp on a Gard-
ner pile driver malfunctioned, allegedly because of defective design.
Lewis sued Gardner under § 402A strict liability theories 4 for design
defect, after having collected workmen's compensation for his injury
from the joint venture. The court dismissed plaintiffs suit, ruling
that the exclusive-remedy provision of the Arkansas Workmen's
Compensation Act35 precluded a claim in tort.
The defendant Gardner was in a classic dual capacity-as plain-
tiff's employer, obligated to provide safe tools, and as manufacturer,
obligated to sell a non-defective and reasonably safe product. The
33. 254 Ark. 17, 491 S.W.2d 778 (1973).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) one who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
A parallel guarantee of quality is given the user or consumer by UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-314:
Section 2-314. Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind. . ..
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used . . ..
35. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1304 (1960).
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employer's failure in Gardner Engineering to provide a "safe" hoist
was the type of occupational risk explicitly covered by the applica-
ble workmen's compensation statute; for breach of this obligation,
the employee's remedy was properly limited to a statutory compen-
sation claim. As a manufacturer, Gardner owed a duty to all users
to market a product not "in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous,"3 including those users who nonfortuitously happened
to be in Gardner's employ. When a user is injured while properly
using a defective and dangerous product, the loss to the user should
be reallocated to the enterprise which can better distribute it to
society. The risk of a manufacturer's dangerously defective design
is not one of the class of risks inherent in the employment relation-
ship which the user-employee can be presumed to assume in return
for the benefits of workmen's compensation. Accordingly, the in-
jured employee should have been permitted to rely on his alterna-
tive status as user to recover for the unreasonable risk posed by the
defective product. The policy goals of strict liability should not be
subverted by the fact that the injured user is an employee of the
manufacturer whose product caused his injury. But the current gen-
eral rejection of the dual-capacity doctrine allows exactly that end.
In addition to the dual-capacity doctrine, there exists a second
exception to the exclusivity rule of workmen's compensation-an
employee's suit against a co-employee or officer of the employer.3 1
Although the employee accepts the risk of a certain amount of negli-
gence on the part of the employer, he is not held to assume the risk
of reckless or willful conduct by co-employees which "substantially"
increases the possibility of injury to him. Nor should the employer's
compensation fund bear the loss for extraordinary risk created wan-
tonly by co-employees. By pursuing an additional claim against a
co-worker for a work-related injury, plaintiff has the opportunity for
more adequate compensation than workmen's compensation pro-
vides.3 1
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
37. Under the fellow servant rule the employee's remedy for breach of obligation by a
fellow servant was a suit against him at common law. Enactment of the workmen's compensa-
tion statutes did not abrogate that right.
38. Suits against certain co-workers, especially officers of a corporation, have a higher
probability of success than most. Foundation for the suit rests on a co-worker's affirmative
act which substantially increases the risk of harm to plaintiff. See, e.g., Cunningham v.
Heard, 134 Ga. App. 276, 214 S.E.2d 190 (1975) (suit against president for violation of safety
1976
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Courts have also permitted lawsuits by an employee against a
workmen's compensation insurance carrier where the carrier's lia-
bility is based on a failure to perform a contractual obligation for
the protection of the class of which plaintiff-employee is a member. 9
A carrier under an obligation to conduct safety inspections or over-
see the insured's safety program can thus be successfully sued by
an employee, injured at his place of employment, for a hazard which
the insurance carrier's inspections should have revealed. The um-
brella of the employer's exclusive remedy defense cannot be ex-
tended to cover the insurance carrier, who has an independent obli-
gation to the injured employee. The carrier mightalso be considered
to have a "dual capacity" with respect to the employee-that of
employer's insurer, and that of third party obligor, the latter of
which is the basis of the employee's suit.
The existence of an elective legislative or judicial cause of action
on behalf of an employee against a third party, is a partial redress
of the inequity of the injured employee's bearing the major cost of
this occupational injury. But the acceptance of the dual-capacity
doctrine vis-d-vis the employer has been limited, and legislatures
have been reluctant to create any statutory exception to the exclu-
sivity provisions of workmen's compensation statutes. The majority
of the working force is thus left with a right to proceed only against
a third party. The limited financial resources of a co-worker defen-
dant may preclude any substantial recovery by a plaintiff from that
source. Insurance carriers, once a favorite defendant for allegedly
negligent safety inspections, have been given statutory immunity
from suit in several states.4 0 An injured workman, confronted with
statute regarding guard rails); Garchek v. Norton Co., 67 Wis. 2d 125, 226 N.W.2d 432 (1975)
(negligence alleged was failure to supervise or institute safety programs and failure to instruct
in use of a grinding machine). Minnesota specifically provides a right to sue a co-employee,
and workmen's compensation will not bar the action even as to a corporate officer, supervisor
or foreman. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.031 (1966). Wisconsin provides that a corporate
officer may be liable for an affirmative act of negligence increasing the employee's risk of
injury. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.29(1) (1973).
39. The carrier's independent obligation to plaintiff was the foundation for suit in Swain
v. J.L. Hudson Co., 60 Mich. App. 361, 230 N.W.2d 433 (1975). But cf. Sims v. American
Cas. Co., 131 Ga. App. 461, 206 S.E.2d 121 (1974) (workmen's compensation carrier enjoys
immunity but can still be sued if some dual capacity exists with respect to the plaintiff-
employee).
40. Illinois and Michigan thought the problem of suit against a workmen's compensation
insurance carrier so serious as to mandate amendment of the state compensation statutes to
prohibit such. See ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 48, § 138.5(a) (Supp. 1975); MIcH. CoMp. LAws ANN. §
418.131 (1967).
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such a situation, must thus turn to the only available party with
adequate resources-a manufacturer or supplier of goods used in the
employment, who can be sued under the strict liability theory of §
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
II. Loss DISTRIBUTION AND THE THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT
A. Basic Principles
One might theorize that the statutory exclusions from suit
granted both employers and insurance carriers combined with the
financial unattractiveness of suits against co-workers would encour-
age injured plaintiff-employees to ask the courts for relief via the
adoption or expansion of existing strict liability doctrines. Given the
concept that "the injured party shall be made reasonably whole,"
it is the responsibility of the loss distribution system to insure that
the financial burdens necessarily following from a compensation to
an injured employee are equitably distributed. Various mechanisms
for the equitable distribution of losses will be considered in this
section and the sections to follow.
Of particular importance is the loss distribution mechanism in
the complex relationship between the plaintiff-employee, the
purchaser-employer, and the third party manufacturer sued under
§ 402A. Consider, for example, the situation where an employee in
the course of his employment sustains severe injury from a grinding
machine purchased by his employer. He claims against the em-
ployer under a workmen's compensation statute and also files suit
against the manufacturer of the machine on strict liability theories.
If the machine is adjudged defective and unreasonably dangerous,
the manufacturer bears the expense of compensating the injured
workman. The social forces which mandated the adoption of strict
liability theories recognize this as the perfect example of risk distri-
bution 4 -the manufacturer (and his insurance carrier) absorb the
cost of the workman's injury as one of the costs of product manufac-
ture for profit. The added cost to the manufacturer can easily be
spread throughout society by an increase in product price. Society
then bears the ultimate economic burden of compensating its
subsector injured by a defective product, just as it bears the burden
41. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., THE LAw OF TORTS § 12.4(3) (1956) [hereinafter cited
as HARPER & JAMES].
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of industrial injury under workmen's compensation.
When a third party has caused injury to a workman for which the
employer has paid an amount as workmen's compensation, justice
demands that the loss to the innocent employer be recouped. The
theory of indemnity shifts the entire loss from the employer, com-
pelled to pay his employee's claim regardless of fault, to the wrong-
doer. In order to effect this recovery, the employer is permitted to
subrogate himself"2 to the claim of the employee against the third
party to recoup what has been paid under workmen's compensa-
tion. 3 The entire loss suffered by the employer, fixed in amount by
statute, is "foreseeable" to the third party tortfeasor, and therefore
may properly be regarded as a "proximate consequence" of the tor-
tious act for which payment must be made. The employer has a
choice of three procedural avenues to indemnification: (1) he can
allow the worker to get judgment and then apply for a lien on the
proceeds of the recovery from the third party;" (2) he can join as a
co-plaintiff or intervene in the employee's suit;4" or (3) he can sue
the third party directly for indemnification." The loss distribution
method thus shifts the burden of the injury from the workman, who
is least able to bear it, to the employer who may ultimately transfer
it to a third party defendant.
The scenario becomes more complex when the employer is not
totally "innocent" but rather has done some affirmative act which
42. Subrogation to the employee's claim is permitted by statute in all states. See, e.g.,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 671 (Supp. 1975). See also W. VANcE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
INSURANCE 798-99 (3d ed. 1951). Indeed, employees under the original workmen's compensa-
tion statutes- gave absolute control over third party claims to the employer in return for
coverage of their claims. The employer had full power, under subrogation theory, to determine
whether a third party would be sued at all. And if the employee pursued a third party suit
without the employer's consent, he was held to have waived all right to workmen's compensa-
tion, regardless of whether the third party suit was a success. Millender, Expanding Employ-
ees' Remedies and Third Party Actions, 17 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 32, 33 (1968).
43. See cases collected in 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 10, § 76.22 at
250.2. The debate as to whether a negligent employer should enjoy a right of subrogation
continues without any real end to the controversy in sight. See Hardman, The Common-Law
Right of Subrogation Under The Workmen's Compensation Acts, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 183 (1920);
Note, Workmen's Compensation: Should a Contributorily Negligent Employer be
Subrogated?, 42 IND. L.J. 430 (1967). See also Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 71, 366 P.2d
641, 649, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 377 (1961) (Traynor, J.) (landmark holding that a negligent
employer in California was henceforth denied subrogation).
44. See, e.g. CAL. LABOR CODE ANN. § 3852 (1971).
45. See, e.g., id. § 3853.
46. See, e.g., id. § 3856(b).
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increased his employee's chance of injury. Let us assume that the
grinding machine in the last hypothetical was originally supplied
without a guard, making it "defective and unreasonably danger-
ous." Assume also that the employer has "negligently" refused to
supply face shields to prevent the employee's being struck by pieces
of scrap from the work piece on the grinding wheel. A grinding wheel
flies apart, and pieces of it strike the unprotected worker. A guard
on the machine would have contained the material and prevented
the worker's injury. A faceshield on the worker could have deflected
the fragments to prevent contact. Both the employer's and the man-
ufacturer's acts are joint causes-indeed, each is a sine qua non of
the employee's injury.
The argument for indemnity from the third-party which was per-
suasive in an innocent-employer situation is now considerably
weakened. One of the basic jural postulates of civilization is the
duty to repair injuries.4" One might think that the employer and the
third party manufacturer in the present hypothetical should equally
bear the burden of the loss. Classic tort treatment would designate
each as a joint tortfeasor, jointly and severally liable for the damage
their combined acts caused. One obstacle exists to this treatment:
the employer, relieved of any obligation of due care under work-
men's compensation statutes, cannot be sued in tort for breach of
obligation by his employee. Since the employer will not be consid-
ered a "tortfeasor" with respect to his employee, he can not be
considered a "joint tortfeasor" with another party.48 Since the statu-
tory and absolute liability of the employer is different "in kind"
from the tort liability of the third party, no common liability can
result. Despite equal "fault," the employer pays only his workmen's
compensation amount, and the third party is liable for the remain-
der of the damages. This difference in the foundation of liability also
bars any attempt by plaintiff-employee to join the employer as a
third party defendant in a suit against a tortfeasor. Where not statu-
torily specified, some courts have denied such joinder based upon
47. "One who intentionally does anything which on its face is injurious to another is liable
to repair the resulting damage unless he can establish a liberty or privilege by identifying
his claim to act as he did with some recognized public or social interest . R. POUND, 5
JURISPRUDENCE § 140 at 283 (1959).
48. Note, Legislative Efforts to Distribute Loss Between Joint Tortfeasors, 45 HARv. L.
REV. 369 (1931). See Gregory, Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A Uniform Practice, 1938
Wis. L. REV. 365.
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the common law rule that no contribution shall be permitted except
in cases of "willful" misconduct. 49
B. Traditional Liss Distribution Mechanisms: Contribution
Liability
The issue of contribution has been addressed in part by the enact-
ment, in twenty-three states, of the Uniform Contribution Among
Joint Tortfeasors Act,5"' which provides rules that define the rights
of contribution among parties liable to a single plaintiff.5 ' Instead
of resolving the issue, passage of the uniform contribution statutes
created a whole spectrum of new problems with respect to existing
workmen's compensation legislation. The statutes from which all
contribution rights inured designated certain parties as "joint tort-
feasors." Characterization of a particular defendant as a "joint tort-
feasor" was a mandatory prerequisite to contribution liability. Ar-
guably, if one could not be designated a "tortfeasor," no contribu-
tion liability could be found to exist. Thus, the employer relieved
of tort obligations by workmen's compensation was one who enjoyed
a total exclusion from contribution liability since he could never be
designated a "tortfeasor." In order to regain some control over such
49. Despite the strict bar that "no one shall profit by his own wrong," defendants had
often attempted to force contribution at common law. Since the processes by which a plaintiff
in medieval England could satisfy his judgment were arbitrary at best, often a judgment was
executed and satisfied against one co-defendant while the other, due to the vagaries of service
of process, went scot-free. The defendant who had paid the entire amount then attempted to
sue a co-defendant for "contribution of a moiety" to recover half his payment. The courts
uniformly disallowed such suits, on the theory that to permit them would be to foster undesir-
able acts and reward wrongdoing. The exception to this rule was the situation where one
wrongdoer was willfully or originally negligent, in which case the less-guilty wrongdoer could
obtain contribution. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 79 nn.41, 44, at 521. Denial of contribution could
be based on a deterrence theory as well. It was thought that the threatening prospect of each
wrongdoer being held liable for the entire consequence would deter potential wrongdoers from
committing wrong. See Thweatt's Adm'r v. Jones, 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 328, 333 (1823). Fear of
contribution, at least theoretically, was important to the criminal or tortfeasor who at some
point thoughtfully assessed the risk of getting caught.
50. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 50 at 307-10.
51. Prior to enactment of the UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORS AcT, the
situation existing in the states varied. Some statutes allowed contribution suits among all
tortfeasors against whom a cause of action existed. Some limited contribution to those against
whom a joint judgment had been rendered, on the theory that no defendant should have to
contribute unless he had been allowed opportunity for his own defense. Others allowed im-
pleader of tortfeasors by any defendant sued singly, or allowed a separate interpleader action
against third parties for contribution. A few statutes allowed contribution only in trespass or
libel cases, or against intentional wrongdoers; certain states rejected contribution in toto.
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statutorily-immune parties, a number of legal fictions were devel-
oped.
The suit against an employer is sometimes characterized as a suit
for "indemnity," rather than as a suit for contribution. While con-
tribution attempts to justly apportion the loss, indemnity shifts the
entire loss to another whose wrongdoing should force him to bear it.
A contribution lawsuit which results in an apportionment of 100%
of the damages to one party is then properly characterized, after the
fact, as a type of indemnity lawsuit. The outcome of an indemnity
lawsuit is not ruled by the characterization of a party as a "joint
tortfeasor," but rather by the existence of a common law obligation
on the part of a wrongdoer to reimburse those wrongdoers whose
faults were the lesser.
Thus, allocation of the burden of compensation in an "indemn-
ity" suit was generally based upon doctrines resurrected from tort
law. In City of Weatherford Water, Light & Ice Co. v. Veit,"2 for
example, a phone company employee was electrocuted by an unin-
sulated wire hanging near the phone pole on which he was working.
The electrical company which owned the wire had failed to correct
the hazard, which fact was well known to the employer-phone com-
pany. Moreover, the phone company failed to warn its employees
of the danger. Two "negligent acts" thus combined to produce a
foreseeable injury, for which the employee's estate sued the electri-
cal company. The court, in evaluating the respective negligent ac-
tions of the two companies in order to allocate loss, settled upon a
distinction between "active" negligence and "passive" negligence.
The electric company's failure to correct the hazard was an omission
amounting to "passive negligence," whereas the phone company's
failure to warn was "active negligence." The electrical company was
thus less responsible than the actively-negligent phone company,
and so recovered indemnification from the phone company for
amounts paid the workman's estate. Difficulties with assessing com-
parative fault in this situation led to adoption of an all-or-none rule
of recovery for the "indemnified" party. Although justice required
an attempt to make some distribution of loss when there was clear
and complementary negligence by more than one party, the court
in Weatherford was content to resolve the important issue of ulti-
52. 196 S.W. 986 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
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mate loss apportionment using the obfuscated test of active versus
passive participation.
No less unsatisfactory is a resolution of the comparative liability
of parties based upon the "last clear chance" doctrine.53 This chron-
ological test is used to apportion all loss to the party who had the
last reasonable opportunity in time to prevent the injury. The
theory is that only the last negligence in time was the "proximate"
cause of the injury. No consideration is given to the relative "wrong-
fulness" of the defendants' successive actions, and the one who
could have halted the disaster is charged with all liability flowing
from the incident. The last wrongdoer is determined to be the worst
wrongdoer and must indemnify all those prior to him in time regard-
less of the qualitative degrees of their contribution to the injury.
One wonders what the result would be in a case where the wrongdoer
who had the last clear chance to prevent the injury was also the
"passive" wrongdoer.
The absurdity of rationale and the unpredictability of result
where loss allocation is ruled by legal fictions like "last clear
chance" or "active-passive negligence"54 should cause courts to ad-
53. The "last clear chance" doctrine holds that the negligence of the one who had the last
reasonable opportunity to avoid the injury is properly designated the proximate cause of the
injury, regardless of relative fault. There has been much disagreement about the viability of
last clear chance. See, e.g., Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause, 6 N.C.L.
REV. 3 (1927); James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938);
Smith, The "Last Clear Chance" Doctrine, 82 CENT. L.J. 425 (1916).
The origin of the doctrine in Davies v. Mann, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex. 1842), which held
a defendant liable for failing to utilize "the last clear chance" to avoid running into plaintiff's
donkey, has combined with the absurdity of some of its results to give it the popular name of
"the jackass doctrine."
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 441 (1965) phrases it as follows:
A plaintiff who has negligently subjected himself to a risk of harm from the defendant's
subsequent negligence may recover for harm caused thereby if, immediately preceding
the harm,
(a) the plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the exercise of reasonable vigilance and
care, and
(b) the defendant is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and compe-
tence his then existing opportunity to avoid the harm, when he
(i) knows of the plaintiff's situation and realizes or has reason to realize the
peril involved in it or
(ii) would discover the situation and thus have reason to realize the peril, if
he were to exercise the vigilance which it is then his duty to the plaintiff to
exercise.
54. The active-passive distinction becomes an important one in those cases where two
separate negligent acts in combination bring about one indivisible result. THE RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 441, comment b, sets forth the distinction thusly:
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dress the real issue of comparative negligence to determine where
loss shall fall.
A standard that would more comport with the principle of equita-
ble loss apportionment is that of pari delicto. If parties are "in pari
delicto"-each with "fault of the same degree and kind"-neither
can be totally indemnified by the other. Most cases involving negli-
gence on the part of employers and third party manufacturers can
be resolved by application of pari delicto principles. Rather than
making contribution cases into false indemnity actions, or em-
ploying the fictions of "active-passive negligence" or "last clear
chance," a court's consideration of the parties' pari delicto status
would necessarily address the issue of the relative degree of fault of
each party. The all-or-nothing recovery characteristic of indemnity
suits would then be available only on a finding that the respective
faults of the parties were significantly different either in degree or
kind.
The standard of pari delicto still does not resolve the issue of loss
apportionment for an employee's injury between the negligent
employer and a third party. The statutory definition of the em-
ployer's liability as exclusive and absolute makes it impossible to
find liability "the same in degree and kind" as that of the third
party sued in tort-as is required for the pari delicto status. Since
there can be no contribution between parties in pari delicto, it
would seem that no contribution recovery between a third party
tortfeasor and a negligent employer can be allowed.
The inequity created by forcing the entire loss onto a third party
is apparent. Not only does the third party have no affirmative right
to force the employer to pay his equitable portion, but the employer
has an affirmative right under subrogation theories to recover from
the third party the sums paid as workmen's compensation. Yet to
allow the negligent employer to escape economically unscathed is
contrary to the principles of equity and justice." The philosophy of
The cases in which the effect of the operation of an intervening force may be important
in determining whether the negligent actor is liable for another's harm are usually,
although not exclusively, cases in which the actor's negligence has created a situation
harmless unless something further occurs, but capable of being made dangerous by the
operation of some new force and in which the intervening force makes a potentially
dangerous situation injurious. In such cases the actor's negligence is often called pas-
sive negligence, while the third person's negligence, which sets the intervening force
in active operation, is called active negligence.
55. It was phrased more poetically by Justice Traynor: "When the employee or his estate
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workmen's compensation in allocating losses for an employee's in-
jury by insurance as a cost of production within that enterprise is
totally defeated by shifting such cost entirely to another enterprise.
The equitable foundation of compensation law that demands of
each party only his fair share of the damages is totally subverted.
The already slight punitive effect of the compensation award as-
sessed against the employer's insurance fund is nullified in toto.
And, perhaps most importantly, the deterrent effect that numerous
awards might have upon the employer's continuation of practices
hazardous to his employee's life and limb is destroyed.
In spite of the overwhelming equitable reasons for denying subro-
gation rights to the negligent employer, some forty-seven states con-
tinue to permit some form of subrogation. At the same time, strict
interpretations of the joint-tortfeasor requirement of the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act deny to a third party any hope
of allocating a fair share of the loss to the negligent employer. This
combination results in particular injustice for the defendant liable
under § 402A theories for an industrial accident.
C. The Industrial Accident Cases: Causation and Liability
Under § 402A strict liability, it is well settled that a manufacturer
who fails to equip a product with safety devices, the absence of
which creates an unreasonable risk of harm to the user, can be held
liable for that harm. 5 Plaintiff, of course, has the burden of proving
has been satisfied, and the employer seeks to recover the amount paid by him, from such third
party, his hands ought not to have the blood of the dead or injured workman upon them, when
he thus invokes the impartial powers and processes of the law .... " Witt v. Jackson, 57
Cal. 2d 57, 71, 366 P.2d 641, 649, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 377 (1961), citing Brown v. Southern Ry.,
204 N.C. 668, 669, 169 S.E. 419, 420 (1933).
56. In Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 410, 290 A.2d 281, 285 (1972), the court
stated:
Where a manufacturer places into the channels of a trade a finished product . . . which
should be provided with safety devices because without such it creates an unreasonable
risk of harm, and where such safety devices can feasibly be installed by the manufac-
turer, the fact that he expects that someone else will install such devices should not
immunize him. The public interest in assuring that safety devices are installed de-
mands more from the manufacturer than to permit him to leave such a critical phase
of his manufacturing process to the haphazard conduct of the ultimate purchaser.
See also Mahoney v. Roper-Wright Mfg. Co., 490 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1973); Pike v. Frank G.
Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970); Balido v. Improved Mach.
Co., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1973); Rivera v. Rockford Mach. & Tool Co., 1
Ill. App. 3d 641, 274 N.E.2d 828 (1971); Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Il. App. 2d 70,
215 N.E.2d 465 (1966); Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972);
Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970).
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that the defective and unreasonably dangerous product was both
the proximate cause and the cause in fact of the injury sustained.
If an act of some third party constitutes an intervening and su-
perseding cause of the injury, the causation claim between the
injury and the product is broken, and there can be no liability under
§ 402A.against the seller of the product." A § 402A defendant cannot
escape all liability merely because of a third party's intervening act
which contributes to plaintiff's harm.5" If the third party's act was
a "foreseeable consequence" of the § 402A defendant's breach of
duty, the § 402A defendant will not be excused from liability. 9
The Restatement (Second) of Torts offers several factors to be
taken into consideration when a shift of liability due to an interven-
ing cause is being considered:
the degree of danger and the magnitude of the risk of harm, the
character and position of the third person . ..his knowledge
of the danger and the likelihood that he will or will not exercise
proper care . . . The most that can be stated here is that
when, byreason of the interplay of such factors, the court finds
that full responsibility for control of the situation and preven-
tion of the threatened harm has passed to the third person, his
failure to act is then a superseding cause, which will relieve the
original actor of liability. 0
When the manufacturer of a machine has met his obligation by
furnishing a safety device necessary for the protection of the work-
men, its removal by the owner of the machine constitutes a su-
57. For example, in Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr.
629 (1970), a paydozer (a large earth moving machine used at construction sites) was ad-
judged defective and unreasonably dangerous because it had no rear-view mirrors. The ab-
sence of this safety device made it impossible for the driver to see any workers at the rear of
the machine; while backing up the machine, the driver struck and killed plaintiff's decedent.
The lack of rear-view mirrors was a cause in fact and the proximate cause of the worker's
death. But had the driver deliberately and maliciously steered the paydozer so as to strike
the decedent, the driver's conduct would have been an "intervening and superseding" cause
relieving the manufacturer of § 402A liability.
58. See, e.g., Rhoads v. Service Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Dorsey v.
Yoder Co., 311 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd sub nom., Yoder Co. v. General Copper &
Brass Co., 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973).
59. Thus, if a defendant fails to add a rear-view mirror to his paydozer, it is foreseeable
that the operator may begin to back the machine without jumping from it to check for the
presence of workers behind him. The third-party driver's act of negligence in not checking to
the rear is, therefore, a forseeable consequence of the failure to provide mirrors. In such a case,
there will be no shift of liability from the manufacturer to the third party.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 452, comment f (1965).
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perseding cause which shifts liability away from the manufacturer."
But what of the situation where the obligation to furnish a safety
device is placed, by law, on the purchaser/user of the machine?62
Can the manufacturer who fails to furnish the safety device plead
that the intervening negligence of the buyer in not supplying the
guard relieves the manufacturer of liability? To hold a user to a duty
of providing a guard which a manufacturer thought unnecessary
seems manifestly unfair. Attempts by manufacturers to evade lia-
bility by claiming it to be the purchaser's responsibility to install a
required device have usually been unsuccessful in light of the manu-
facturer's overwhelming familiarity with the operating characteris-
tics and potential hazards of his machine. In such cases, the courts
are understandably reluctant to relieve the manufacturer of his obli-
gation to design a reasonably safe product by shifting the blame to
a third party on superseding-negligence grounds.
A far different liability picture is presented when a third-party
employer's negligence combines with a "defective" product to cul-
minate in an injury to the third party's employee. Assume, for
example, that a manufacturer has provided a guard over the revolv-
ing shaft of a washing machine. The guard is necessary to prevent
the rotating shaft's entangling the clothing or equipment of workers
in the machine's vicinity. The employer orders the guard removed
and subsequently an employee is injured in the exact manner that
the guard was intended to prevent. 3 The injured employee has two
remedies: (1) he can claim under workmen's compensation and (2)
he can sue the manufacturer for a design defect alleging that the
guard should have been permanently affixed to the machine. The
suit against the manufacturer is sure to be pursued, given the possi-
bility of total compensation that it presents. A jury, asked to decide
between a disabled worker and the enterprise which markets the
product which injured him, may shade the technical issues of defect
and causation in order to arrive at a verdict for the plaintiff. The
manufacturer must assimilate the full cost of the injury into his
fixed costs, but the employer gets away with a minimum payment
under the workmen's compensation statute, which payment may be
recouped from the manufacturer by subrogation.
61. See Smith v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 302 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1962).
62. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 25-1 to -15 (1964). See also Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
63. See, e.g., Hartman v. Miller Hydro Co., 499 F.2d 191 (10th Cir. 1974).
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1. The Grinding Wheel Cases
Another hypothetical will further illustrate the inequity of the
present system. Assume a manufacturer of grinding wheels supplies
various types of wheels to industrial concerns for use on their own
grinding machines. Despite various design innovations, grinding
wheels have a propensity to disintegrate after long periods of use.
The wheels are formed of an abrasive material laminated to a cen-
tral core, which is usually reinforced to withstand the stresses pro-
duced by rotation at the very high speeds characteristic of the
grinding operation. The reinforcement minimizes the stresses on the
abrasive, but no design yet developed can guarantee a wheel which
will not fly apart after hours of punishing use. However, one design
solution has been developed to negate the possibility of an em-
ployee's being injured by flying pieces from a disintegrating grind-
ing wheel. That solution is a guard on the machine itself, which
contains the flying pieces should a wheel fail in use. Under most
state laws, .it is the legal responsibility of the employer to install
such a guard.64
When an employer removes a guard or fails to provide one, his
negligence becomes a proximate cause of his employee's injury due
to disintegration of the wheel. Yet the only sanction against the
employer is his payment of a workmen's compensation claim. 5 The
third party grinding wheel manufacturer who loses to the employee
on a § 402A claim pays him full compensation, and in most states
also must reimburse the employer for amounts he paid the employee
under the workmen's compensation statute. No attempt is made to
weigh the employer's contribution to the employee's injury and to
assess him a fair share of the costs of such injury.
The grinding wheel manufacturer may attempt to warn prospec-
tive users of the danger of performing a grinding operation without
a guard by stamping on the wheel itself "Use Safety Guard." The
64. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit 43, § 25-1 (1964).
65. Injured employees have forced courts to weigh the interest of the employer in being
free from suit at common law by alleging that the employer's conduct was so reprehensible
as to remove him from the purview of the workmen's compensation statute. See, e.g., San-
tiago v. Brill Monfort Co., 205 N.Y.S.2d 919 (App. Div. 1960), aff'd, 10 N.Y.2d 718, 176
N.E.2d 835, 219 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1961), where the employer removed safety guards in a deliber-
ate effort to increase production, the negligence was alleged to be so outrageous as to consti-
tute an assault. The court held that the employer's negligence was not so outrageous as to
give rise to a separate cause of action for the employee who could recover under the workmen's
compensation statute.
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employer purchasing the wheel certainly can be said to have re-
ceived notice of the danger from such a warning. But even a warning
such as this is no guarantee of immunity from suit on § 402A
grounds. In Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Black & Decker Manu-
facturing Co.," an employee was injured by flying pieces of a grind-
ing wheel sold but not manufactured by Black & Decker. Plaintiff
sued Black & Decker for placing on the market a wheel
unreasonably dangerous to the public and for failing to warn users
of its dangerous propensities. The wheel in question had the stan-
dard label attached, which contained the following information:
"Warning: Thread wheel on spindle by hand. Do not thread wheel
by starting motor. Use Safety Guard." Despite the presence of this
label on every wheel purchased by plaintiff's employer, no safety
guards had been purchased for any of the grinding machines.
The injured employee settled before trial but the employer's com-
pensation carrier, Bituminous, continued the suit under a subroga-
tion theory against Black & Decker to recover amounts it had paid
to the plaintiff as workmen's compensation. The crucial issue at
trial was that of the sufficiency of the warning on the grinding
wheel. The plaintiff claimed that since a grinding wheel was "inher-
ently dangerous," the seller had a duty to supply warnings as to the
risks and dangers involved in the product's use. The defendant
countered that the intervening negligence of the employer broke the
causation chain. The trial court rendered a verdict for defendant,
but the appellate court reversed. Plaintiff had argued that the "in-
jury" to the employee resulted from the "foreseeable misuse" of the
grinding wheel without a safety guard on the machine. The appel-
late court accepted the argument that an "adequate" warning
would have prevented the foreseeable consequence of the employee's
injury by causing both employee and employer to heed the warning
to "Use Safety Guard." Since the instant warning had not, clearly,
it was an inadequate one.
What more can be asked of a grinding wheel manufacturer. He
recognizes his product is inherently dangerous beyond a level which
any design modification can cure. He realizes that the one certain
safeguard against injury when a wheel disintegrates is a guard on
the machine. He stamps a label on his product that it should not
be used without a safety guard on the machine. A more detailed
66. 518 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
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warning could just as easily be ignored: "Possibility of severe injury
or death exists if you are struck by pieces of this grinding wheel
should it disintegrate. The only way to avoid injury is to use a safety
guard on your machine."
The grinding wheel cases do not address the key issue-the inter-
vening negligence of the machine owner in refusing to purchase
guards for the grinding machines. To say that an adequate warning
by the wheel manufacturer is the solution to the entire problem, as
the court in Black & Decker did, is a simplistic evasion of the real
issue. Until the law imposes legal responsibility upon the owner for
failing to exercise that minimum caution demanded of a reasonable
man, no manufacturer's warning will compel that caution, and the
employee will continue to.be confronted with the equally-repugnant
alternatives of a dangerous work environment or no work at all. 7
2. Retrofitted Safety Device Cases
In their efforts to mete out justice in safety-device design cases,
courts have been confronted with numerous complex permutations
and refinements of the basic premise that a design marketed with-
out a safety device may constitute a defective design. What circum-
stances will excuse a manufacturer from liability for a design placed
on the market without such a device, the presence of which would
have averted an unreasonable risk of injury to users?
Assume, for example, that a manufacturer determines, several
years after the distribution of a certain machine, that a safety guard
is necessary to prevent an unreasonable risk of injury. He under-
takes to notify all purchasers of the availability of a safety device
at a reasonable price or offers to install the device entirely at his own
expense. An advertising campaign advises purchasers of the import-
ance of retrofitting the guards to their machines. For reasons of their
own, a substantial number of purchasers decline the tender of the
safety device, fully aware of the unreasonableness of their decision.
An employee of one of the "unreasonable" purchasers is then in-
jured by the admittedly dangerous unguarded machine. Since the
manufacturer must concede the defectiveness of the design, he
will-when suit is filed by the injured user-rest his case on the
67. The unattractiveness of the alternative to assuming this risk-that of the employee's
being fired for refusing to work on an unguarded machine-is of course legally irrelevant to
temper the voluntariness of his decision.
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causation issue, pleading that the cause of the injury is in fact the
purchaser's failure to install the safety device recommended by the
manufacturer. The manufacturer pleads that all reasonable steps
have been taken to correct the error in design, and that the pur-
chaser's willful and knowing refusal to install the device is a su-
perseding cause of the injury as a matter of law.
This is illustrated in Balido v. Improved Machinery Co. ," wherein
plaintiff-employee's right hand was crushed in a molding press
owned by her employer, Olympic Plastics Co., and manufactured by
defendant, Improved. At the time of its manufacture in 1950, the
press had been equipped with a lift-type safety gate which, when
fully closed, covered the operating area of the press. As the gate
closed, it barred employee access to the danger area and closed an
electric switch enabling the machine to begin the molding opera-
tion. After the press had been on the market for several years, the
manufacturer redesigned the safety gate to comply with a 1949 Cali-
fornia industrial safety order requiring that all plastic presses be
equipped with a sliding safety gate rather than a lift-type gate. In
1954, the manufacturer incorporated into all presses the new gate
design and then offered for sale to all owners of the pre-1954 presses
a safety package which would bring the presses into compliance
with the safety order. The manufacturer notified Olympic that its
press failed to meet current safety standards and suggested that
Olympic purchase the safety package. Despite several notices to this
effect, Olympic refused to purchase the device. In 1965, the plaintiff
was injured when the press closed as she moved the safety lift gate
to rearrange a workpiece on the machine. Both the trial court and
the court of appeals considered the crucial causation argument that
Olympic's failure to install the new safety gate was a superseding
cause relieving the manufacturer of design liability."
68. 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1973).
69. Cf. Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972) wherein the manufac-
turer had sold a power press without any safety devices. Custom in the trade was for the
purchaser to install any devices that his individualized operations might require. The court
held that the question of whether the purchaser's failure to add devices constituted a su-
perseding cause depended on the foreseeability, from the manufacturer's standpoint, of the
purchaser's failure to do so. Accord, Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286
(1972). Cf. Rhoads v. Service Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Ark. 1971) where a press
had been shipped with a sign warning that it was not to be used without a safety guard. The
owner of the press failed to install a guard even though cited by the state department of labor
for failure to do so. The court rejected the manufacturer's argument that the owner's neglect
relieved the manufacturer of liability, noting that it was foreseeable that a purchaser might
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The case was factually distinguishable from the line of cases
wherein a manufacturer makes no effort to make available a safety
device or to emphasize the need for one, yet attempts to shift the
responsibility for installing one to the purchaser-these decisions
consistently deny such a shift of responsibility. The very action
upon which the manufacturer bases his request for a release from
liability is a foreseeable consequence of the manufacturer's original
failure to make available such a device. To ask a purchaser to install
a device that a manufacturer in his superior design experience
thinks unnecessary is to ask that purchaser to spend money on an
item of dubious value. It is only when the manufacturer has taken
all reasonable steps to convince the purchaser of the necessity for
installing the device that a shift in responsibility should even be
considered.
The manufacturer who attempts to correct a design deficiency as
the manufacturer in Balido did is in an extremely difficult posi-
tion.70 If the court decides that the liability-triggering event is the
placing on the market of a defectively designed product, any effort
at correction after the fact, regardless of how noble it is, will not bar
strict liability. If the decision turns upon causation, the foreseeabil-
ity of the purchaser's admittedly unreasonable refusal to install a
safety device eliminates that as a superseding cause of the injury.
Of what use is it, then, for a manufacturer to undertake an expen-
sive recall or retrofit program to correct a design deficiency? A sub-
stantial number of purchasers may be unlocatable due to lapse of
time or subsequent resale(s) of the product. Some of the owners may
remain unpersuaded as to the merits of the program and refuse to
upgrade their equipment. The manufacturer's liability exposure for
fail to heed a warning or comply with a state statute as a consequence of the manufacturer's
failure to include a guard in the original design.
70. A termination of design liability under negligence theories has been permitted in cases
where the manufacturer has taken all reasonable care to correct the defect. See, e.g., Ford
Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 840 (1946), where an auto manufacturer
was relieved of liability for a defective hood design by its good-faith efforts to correct the error
'by installing a new hood-latch free of charge to purchasers. Plaintiff had purchased his auto
from a prior owner who had refused the manufacturer's tender, and this refusal was held to
be a superseding cause insulating the manufacturer from harm. In Rekab, Inc. v. Frank
Hrubetz & Co., 261 Md. 141, 274 A.2d 107 (1971), the manufacturer of an amusement park
ride determined that a stronger spindle was needed in the ride. It issued a letter to all
purchasers that warned them not to set the ride up for the forthcoming season without
installing a heavy duty spindle which the manufacturer was shipping at his cost. The failure
of the park owner to heed the warning was held to insulate the manufacturer from liability.
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his breach of the threshold design duty has been decreased very
little. The only decrease in liability is that inuring from the class of
users whose employers have seen fit to heed the message of the recall
program, and that number may be small indeed. The cost of the
correction program thus appears to be considerable without guar-
anteeing any substantial return on the investment in the form of
decreased liability. A reasonable economic decision on the part of
the manufacturer might be to discontinue all defective design
correction attempts, regardless of how socially desirable they may
be.
Under risk allocation theories,7 the risk of loss as between an
injured user and the manufacturer of the defective machine must
be allocated to the enterprise. But when loss is to be allocated be-
tween a manufacturer that has done everything reasonable to cor-
rect a deficiency and a purchaser's enterprise that has deliberately
precluded the success of the correction effort by refusing to partici-
pate in it, it is the purchaser's enterprise that should bear the loss.
As between the two, the purchaser is clearly more capable of pre-
venting the harm and more culpable for not having done so. Admit-
tedly, there is a problem in identifying any classical tort duty on the
part of the purchaser which would support an action by the manu-
facturer for failure to do an affirmative act which would save the
manufacturer from harm. Willful failure to install a safety device
is a breach of the employer's obligation to his employees, for which
he is relieved of liability under the workmen's compensation stat-
ute. The manufacturer cannot be heard to complain that the breach
of the employer's obligation to his employees has resulted in harm
to the manufacturer. The manufacturer finds himself in an unenvia-
ble position rather like that of the drowning man whose neighbor
owes him no legal duty to do an affirmative act which would save
his life.
3. Component Manufacturing Cases
Focusing on the owner's capability of avoiding harm leads to an
even stronger conclusion of culpability in product liability cases
involving component manufacturers. In Taylor v. Paul 0. Abbe,
Inc. ,72 plaintiff-employee sustained severe injury when his right
71. The deterrent theory of enterprise liability is discussed in 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra
note 41, §§ 11.4(3), 13.2.
72. 516 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1975).
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hand was caught in the nip point of two interlocking gears of a
pebble mill. The mill was owned and operated by plaintiff's em-
ployer, Superior Zinc Co., and had been purchased by them in 1909
from a manufacturer that was not a party to the suit. The employer
was impleaded as a third party defendant in the plaintiff's product
liability suit against the parts supplier, Abbe. Abbe had contracted
to supply replacement parts for the pebble mill, and had furnished,
inter alia, the two gears into which plaintiff s hand had been pulled.
Abbe had offered to provide a guard over the machine at the point
at which the gears meshed, but this offer had been rejected by the
employer. Plaintiff alleged that the lack of a guard over the gears
and the lack of an on-off switch located near the operator were
defects which made the mill unreasonably dangerous. The crux of
the case was the alleged liability of the parts supplier, Abbe, for
failing to correct the design defects existing in the machine. Plaintiff
argued that the guard was an integral part of the "functioning
unit," i.e., the two gears, sold by Abbe. The court disagreed, holding
that as a matter of law a parts supplier was not responsible for the
absence of a guard if a bona fide offer to supply the safety device
had been made but rejected.73 As between the employer and the
parts supplier, the risk of loss was allocated to the enterprise more
clearly capable of averting the injury. It would be unreasonable to
place on the supplier the burden of demanding that a purchaser
order a safety device as a precondition to the remainder of the sale.
But as between the employee and his employer, the decision that
responsibility for the absence of the guard is the employer's would
be a meaningless exercise in light of workmen's compensation. De-
73. The court allocated responsibility for the lack of the guard thusly:
Of critical importance in this case is the undisputed testimony that Abbe offered to
sell such a guard to Superior but that Superior refused it. Under these circumstances,
we think it clear that the responsibility for the absence of the guard should be placed
on Superior rather than Abbe, since Superior was the party which made the decision
as to the composition of the fully assembled mill.
Id. at 148. But compare Lockett v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D. Pa. 1974) where
a supplier had provided several gears to a shipbuilder without any guard. The court held that
the supplier was under no duty to furnish a guard or to make inspections or tests to determine
the necessity for one. Nor was the supplier under any obligation to find out if the shipbuilder
planned to install a guard. The only liability might be if the supplier had reason to believe
that the user would not realize the danger of operation without a guard, and failed to advise
him of the necessity for one. It is arguable whether the failure to tender a guard per se is
actionable against a supplier, who has no mechanism for coercing his purchaser into accepting
the tender and who may be at a considerable disadvantage with the purchaser if he tries to
press the point.
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spite the fact that the employee does not accept as a risk inherent
in the employment relationship his employer's deliberate disobedi-
ence of a safety statute or of a supplier's well-taken warning, the
employee has no cause of action against his employer. The uncom-
pensated portion of the loss for the injury falls squarely on the
shoulders of the one least able to have prevented it or distributed
it. The court's allocation of responsibility for the injury to the em-
ployer is but a slap on the wrist in light of the employer's exemption
from liability under workmen's compensation.74
4. The "Failure to Warn" Cases
The supplier or manufacturer meets his legal obligation when the
means chosen to convey a warning or instruction critical to safe use
of a product are reasonably designed to apprise the ultimate user of
the dangers inherent in product use.75 But how is the liability issue
to be resolved when a manufacturer issues adequate warnings which
nevertheless fail to reach the ultimate user due to the intervention
of a third party? The easy answer to the liability question is to affix
liability on the intervening third party whose negligent action may
have disrupted the transmittal of the warning to the injured user.
In West v. Broderick & Bascom Wire Rope Co.,76 a plaintiff iron
worker was injured when a wire rope used for pulling heavy machi-
nery broke. The rope, whose ultimate breaking strength was eight-
een tons, was rated for safe use at one-fifth of that capacity (3.6
tons) to avoid the possibility of injury to users. The machinery for
which the rope was being used at the time of the injury to plaintiff
was a fifty-four and a half ton press, a load three times greater than
74. Cf. Bond v. Transairco Co., 514 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1975).
75. Under developed § 402A principles, a manufacturer has an affirmative duty to warn
purchasers and users of a product's dangerous characteristics particularly if the risk posed
by the product is an unobvious one. Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850
(1945). The product should be accompanied by such labeling, instructions or warnings neces-
sary to convince a reasonably-prudent user of the dangers of product misuse. The duty to
warn extends to any chattel intrinsically dangerous for the uses for which they are supplied,
such as an explosive. See, e.g., Doss v. Apache Powder Co., 430 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1970);
Eck v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 393 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1968); Callahan v. Keystone
Fireworks Mfg. Co., 72 Wash. 2d 823, 435 P.2d 626 (1967). The duty also pertains to products
which only became dangerous when acted upon by external forces-such as a paint product,
dangerously combustible when exposed to heat. Panther Oil & Grease Mfg. Co. v. Segerstrom,
224 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1955); Crane v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 754 (1963).
76. 197 N.W.2d 202 (Iowa 1972).
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the maximum the rope could sustain and fifteen times greater than
its advisable load. The manufacturer had prepared literature de-
scribing the ultimate breaking strength and safe working capacities
of its various wire ropes. Each rope also carried a metal tag which
listed its working capacity. The manufacturer had sold the rope to
a supplier who had resold it to plaintiff's employer. Somewhere in
that distributive chain, the descriptive literature and metal tags
became separated from the rope, so that the warning as to safe
working capacity never reached the ultimate user of the product.
The employees responsible for moving the press testified that had
they known the rated capacity of that rope, they never would have
attempted to use it.
Upon whom should ultimate liability rest for the severe injuries
sustained by plaintiff in a case such as this?" If the manufacturer's
choice of a warning mechanism is shown to be a reasonable one, his
duty to the ultimate user has been fulfilled. If the warning is ade-
quate, but a third party has removed the warning from the product,
the "cause" of user injury is not a breach of the duty to warn ab
initio but rather the intervening negligence of a third party. It seems
only proper and just to charge the negligent third party with respon-
sibility for the user's loss. The logic fails only when that third party
is also the employer, immune from suit by workmen's compensation
statute.
The statutory immunity of the employer in failure-to-warn cases
poses a serious barrier to a court's attempt to do justice. Often the
employer, as the buyer of the product, receives all descriptive infor-
mation and warnings that the manufacturer has thought necessary
to provide so as to fulfill his legal obligation. The employer then
may fail-perhaps carelessly, perhaps with deliberate disregard for
the user's welfare-to. transfer the requisite information to the em-
ployee, the "ultimate user" of the product. The harm that results
is exactly that which the manufacturer's warnings sought to pre-
vent. Nevertheless, the only avenue of recovery for the injured em-
ployee is a claim against the manufacturer of inadequate warning.
At some point, the intervening negligence of the employer becomes
77. In West v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 197 N.W.2d 202 (Iowa 1972), the jury found
against the defendant manufacturer on the issue of adequacy of the warning placed on the
wire rope, despite uncontroverted testimony by defendant that defendant had issued descrip-
tive literature suggesting appropriate working capacities for each size and had placed a metal
tag listing the safe working capacity on each rope at manufacture. The Supreme Court of Iowa
refused to overturn the verdict on appeal.
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important enough to constitute the sole legal cause of the injury,
and the employee's suit against the manufacturer fails on this caus-
ation issue. This same negligence which constitutes a proximate
cause of the injury cannot afford any basis for recovery by the em-
ployee.
In Bryant v. Hercules, Inc. , personal representatives of eight coal
miners fatally injured in a mine explosion sued a dynamite manu-
facturer. The explosion was caused when a fragment projected from
the blasting area struck and detonated a quantity of explosives
stored forty-five feet from the blasting. The complaint alleged a
failure to warn of the emplosives' dangerous propensity to detonate
upon impact and failure to instruct in its safe use. The manufac-
turer supplied with each delivery a consumer's guide to handling,
storing and using explosives. The guide cautioned the user to make
sure that all surplus explosives were "in a safe place" when blasting
was being done and not to place explosives where they might be
exposed to "flame, heat, sparks or impact." Of relevance was the
statutory obligation placed on the employer coal company with re-
spect to storage of explosives-both the federal and state mine
safety codes"9 had established mandatory procedures for storing
unused explosives away from blasting sites. All of the employer's
supervisory personnel were aware of the danger of storing unused
explosives where a shock might cause premature detonation. In-
deed, prior to the date of the fatal explosion, federal mine inspec-
tions had cited the defendant's mine five times for violations of the
regulations on explosives storage. The explosives responsible for the
fatal accident were stored in violation of both the federal and the
state statutes. The court, in Bryant, correctly determined that the
willful negligence of the coal company in disregarding all warnings
amounted to a superseding cause that severed whatever causal
connection there might have been between the manufacturer's
omission of an adequate warning and the deaths resulting from the
explosion. Nor was the manufacturer held liable for failing to foresee
that one user (the employer) would behave so negligently toward a
second user (the miners) as to totally disregard all precautions for
the second user's safety. The manufacturer had a duty to warn users
of the product's dangerous propensities so that users could avoid
78. 325 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Ky. 1970).
79. Federal Mine Safety Code, 30 U.S.C. §§ 873 (f), (g) (1970); Ky. REV. STAT. ch.
352.241(7) (1972).
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injury by an appropriate modification of their behavior. The plain-
tiffs' last resort, the contention that the manfuacturer's warning was
inadequate because it failed to influence the conduct of the ultimate
users, was not considered persuasive by the court.
The facts which should have determined liability were the coal
company's total indifference to both the manufacturer's warnings
and the statutory prohibitions against storing explosives too near a
blasting site. The practical effect of such an adjudication of gross
negligence on the part of the coal company would ordinarily be a
corresponding obligation of total reparation for the injury. Since the
coal company was the statutorily-exempt employer of the victims,
state law provided that a determination of statutory negligence
would trigger payment of an additional 15 %8 over the workmen's
compensation benefits as a penalty-a fact which no doubt was a
small consolation to the plaintiff-survivors. When the only
economically-feasible defendant is a supplier of the product that
occasioned the injury, it is not surprising for a plaintiff to adduce
any theory of defect, regardless of how unsubstantiable, in an effort
to get his case before a jury. The plethora of product liability law-
suits is testimony to the fact that recovery for industrial accidents
under the workmen's compensation statutes is woefully inadequate.
III. "THE MOST EVENLY-BALANCED CONTROVERSY"
A. The Economic Model for Loss Distribution
The allocation of loss for employee injury between a negligent
employer and a third party tortfeasor has been called "the most
evenly-balanced controversy" in tort law.8' Contrariwise, the statu-
tory bar of workmen's compensation statutes has been extended
into an area which was not originally contemplated-where a third
party tortfeasor is denied the right to contribution from a negligent
employer. The present system of awarding total recovery to one
party, the employer, by allowing him to recover his compensation
award by subrogation to the injured employee's action against the
third party tortfeasor is contrary to the equitable principles of loss
80. Ky. REV. STAT. ch. 342.165 (1973).
81. 2A LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 10, § 76.10 at 287.
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distribution. The current evasion of responsibility by a negligent
employer cannot be reconciled with either of the societal interests
served by a well-conceived loss-adjusting mechanism: "to make the
injured party whole, and to seek out the true wrongdoer whenever
possible."8 The criticism leveled against the common law rule bar-
ring contribution among tortfeasors is applicable here: "There is
obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire
burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, uninten-
tionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone . . . ." Nor
are principles of equity served when the law orders one equally-
culpable obligor to be relieved of his minimum statutory share of the
cost of injury, resulting in an unjust enrichment of the employer
totally repugnant to law and equity.
The economic model of loss distribution assumes that the cost of
injury will be borne by the enterprise most capable of reallocation.
When a loss within one enterprise, the employer's, is shifted in toto
to that of the product manufacturer, the loss distribution model
fails. The perfect working of the system assumes that the enterprise
upon which the loss is fixed will be capable of spreading the cost to
society over a period of time by increasing product prices. When the
manufacturing enterprise is asked to bear the cost of workmen's
compensation properly allocatable to the employer, that enterprise
may find it difficult to recoup its losses from society quickly
enough. 4 The ultimate result of the unfair reallocation of the entire
compensation burden to manufacturing may result in burdening
82. Id.
83. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 50 at 307.
84. The imperfections in the enterprise's allochtion process may result in an inability to
recover its costs from society via a price raise. The additional burden of strict liability has
caused one manufacturer, Havir Manufacturing Co., St. Paul, Minn., who produces large
industrial presses, to go out of business. American Metal Market/Metalworking News, Aug.
25, 1975, at 16. Florida ameliorated the manufacturer's dilemma by setting a seventeen-year
statute of limitations for actions against a seller for causes of action in strict liability, the
statute beginning to run when the product is sold, not when the injury is sustained-a
solution that is also being considered in Massachusetts. See American Metal Market/
Metalworking News, Dec. 22, 1975, at 25.
One commentator has suggested that cases involving complex "polycentric" product
design issues are beyond the court's limits of adjudication. Henderson, Judicial Review of
Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
1531 (1973). Other commentators have suggested that the system could be improved by
making the trial process more reflective of the demands of § 402A. Weinstein, Twerski,
Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 DuQ. L. REV.
425 (1974).
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that enterprise to a point beyond which it cannot function.
The societal interest in deterring irresponsible behavior is frus-
trated by the statutory avoidance of responsibility permitted a neg-
ligent employer. The law on the one hand creates a duty, but on the
other hand finds itself incapable of coercing obedience to the duty.
The vast majority of states have safety statutes purporting to regu-
late employer conduct; the enforcement of these statutes is frus-
trated due to the statutory bar of the workmen's compensation stat-
utes. While the law appears to create a right on the part of the
employee to demand minimal conduct by the employer, it withholds
a remedy whereby the right can be vindicated." Neither the safety
statutes nor the workmen's compensation statutes result in that
deterrence of wrongful conduct which is an essential purpose of any
tort liability system.
Judicial dissatisfaction with the unfair allocation of loss between
employer and third party has resulted in some ingenious evasions
of the exclusive-remedy provision of workmen's compensation. The
first invasion of the citadel of employer immunity was the judicial
determination that the compensation statutes did not bar suits by
a third party founded upon an employer's duty to him extraneous
to the employer-employee relationship. If a third party is held liable
for an employee's injury, and the employer contributed to the injury
by dereliction of a duty with respect to the third party, the employer
would be forced to contribute his pro rata share of the total cost, not
just the statutory minimum he had paid his employee. This addi-
tional duty has usually been founded in a contract between the
employer and the third party. In Stevens v. Polinsky,N for example,
a lessor demised premises to an employer whose agreed obligation
was to maintain the property. An employee who tripped and injured
himself while on that property sued the lessor, who in turn sued the
lessee-employer for indemnity. Denying the employer's defense that
the workmen's compensation statute barred the employer's sharing
the cost of the injury, the court held that the lessee's contractual
obligation of maintenance supported the lessor's right to indemnifi-
cation. The lessee's duty of maintenance was no doubt intended to
85. Ubijus, ibi remedium. "Where there is a right, there is a remedy" is one of the basic
postulates of restitution law. A right without a correlative ability to enforce it is worth
nothing.
86. 32 Conn. Super. 96, 341 A.2d 25 (1974). Accord, Ruvolo v. United States Steel Corp.,
133 N.J. Super. 362, 336 A.2d 508 (1975).
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benefit the lessor by insuring that the property would be cared for
while also shifting the responsibility of making repairs to the one
most capable of ascertaining the need for them. A foreseeable conse-
quence of the failure to make repairs was the exposure of the lessor
to a lawsuit by persons injured on the property. The employer's
interest in being free from suit for an employee's injury yielded to
the stronger interest of the lessor in receiving the benefits of his
contractual bargain.
A legitimate query regarding the independent-duty doctrine is
whether it might allow a manufacturer to sue an employer whose
conduct has affirmatively increased the manufacturer's liability
exposure to third parties. The identification of a specific duty upon
which liability might be based is admittedly difficult, but the duty
might be in the nature of one not to do any act which is prohibited
by existing law (such as a safety statute)."' The recognition of an
additional tort or contract duty extraneous to workmen's compensa-
tion does not involve the delicate policy question regarding judicial
invasion of the legislative domain that allowance of suit within the
workmen's compensation statute would. Despite the obvious proce-
dural advantages and equitable results that would occur, the exist-
ence of a duty in tort on the part of an employer toward a manufac-
turer has yet to be recognized by any court as a foundation for a
manufacturer's indemnity suit.
Rather than address the question of whether a separate duty on
the part of an employer should be recognized, some states do at-
tempt to balance the scales between an employer and a third-party
tortfeasor by denying to a negligent employer the right to recoup,
by subrogation, the compensation amounts paid.8"
87. A manufacturer such as that in Balido could then sue an employer who had disobeyed
a safety statute requiring the installation of safety devices. The manufacturer whose buyer
had intentionally disregarded the manufacturer's warnings on product use, to the detriment
of an employee-user, could also recover. For example, the failure of an employer to convey to
an employee the warnings for use of a dangerous chemical, or to obey the caution stamped
on a grinding wheel to use it only with a guard, would be actionable by a manufacturer held
liable to a user on strict liability theories.
88. For example, California, North Carolina and South Carolina have proscribed the
negligent employer's subrogation rights by allowing the third party to plead the employer's
negligence as a defense to the suit for recoupment of the compensation claim. American Cas.
Co. v. South Carolina Gas Co., 124 F. Supp. 30 (W.D.S.C. 1954); Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d
57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961); Lovette v. Lloyd, 236 N.C. 663, 73 S.E.2d 886
(1953).
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B. The Pennsylvania Rule
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Maio v. Fahs,9 considered
the issue of subrogation in light of the third party's right to contri-
bution among joint tortfeasors. The court balanced the third party's
equitable right to share liability with co-tortfeasors under the con-
tribution statute against the employer's statutory obligation to pay
only a limited compensation, and concluded that the employer was
liable for contribution up to the limit set by the workmen's compen-
sation statute. 0 Under the Pennsylvania rule, the injured employee
could recover a statutory amount from his employer, and then sue
a third party in tort. If the third party proves that the employer has
been negligent, the employer is liable for his pro rata share of the
damages, not to exceed the amount for which he would be liable
under statute. The third party's liability is thus diminished by the
employee's award under the statute. For example, if the loss to the
employee is $30,000 and the employer has paid $8,000 in workmen's
compensation, the Pennsylvania rule prevents the negligent em-
ployer from recovering the $8,000 from the third party tortfeasor.
The third party is liable for $22,000, the difference between the total
damage award and the amount of the employer's contribution,
The Pennsylvania rule is conditioned upon a broad definition of
the term "joint tortfeasor." The traditional bar to contribution by
the employer had been the semantic distinction that the employer
could not be liable "in tort" when his only liability to an employee
was not under tort principles but by statute. The court in Maio
broadened the definition of "joint tortfeasor" from those with a
89. 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940).
90. The court's interpretation was derived from and limited by the Pennsylvania contri-
bution statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §§ 2082-89 (1967), which states that the term "tortfea-
sors" means two or more persons jointly or severally liable.
In order to clarify the definition of joint tortfeasor when it is sought to be applied to an
employer seeking immunity from contribution under the workmen's compensation statute,
the California legislature has amended its contribution statute and specifically abrogated the
precedents rejected in the landmark decision of Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641,
17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961). See CAL. CODE. Civ. Poc. §§ 875-80 (1955), as amended (Supp.
1976).
91. For the mechanics of the Pennsylvania rule, see 2A LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
'nON, supra note 10, § 76.22 at 14-306. If the liability of the third party is $30,000, technically
the third party pays the plaintiff the entire amount and then recovers from him the $8,000
which the negligent employer has paid plaintiff under workmen's compensation. It seems
simpler to let the plaintiff keep the employer's $8,000, have the third party pay only $22,000,
and enjoin the employer from attempting to collect the $8,000 from the third party.
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common liability to include any persons guilty of having contrib-
uted to a tort. This original definition of "tortfeasor" was further
refined by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Elston v. Industrial
Lift Truck Co.92 The notion of "joint tortfeasor," the court declared,
"does not require. . . a common liability toward the injured party,
but only that their combined conduct be the cause of the injury."93
The employer whose conduct partially causes injury would thus be
liable for contribution.
The Pennsylvania rule, denying subrogation to the employer
while enforcing contribution on his part to a third party tortfeasor,
has been called "the fairest available compromise in light of all the
conflicting policy interests."94 The Pennsylvania rule has been
cited95 for alleviating several of the injustices that failure to permit
contribution creates:
[T]he Pennsylvania rule . . . (1) . . . preserves the economics
of the workmen's compensation system; (2) . . . effectuates the
policy of contribution . . . (3) . . . harmonizes the compensa-
tion law with the law of contribution and (4) . . . protects the
non-employer tortfeasor from the possible gross inequity of
carrying the whole liability for wrongs caused in perhaps major
part by the employer tortfeasor11
92. 420 Pa. 97, 216 A.2d 318 (1966). The court enumerated the test to be one of combined
conduct which causes an injury rather than "joint liability" to the injured party. Id. at 102
n.2, 216 A.2d at 320 n.2. The decision culminated the logic of a prior line of cases specifically
addressing this issue. See, e.g., Brown v. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454, 155 A.2d 836 (1959); Maio v.
Fahs, 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940); Stark v. Posh Constr. Co., 192 Pa. Super. 409, 162 A.2d
9 (1960) (interpreting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 671 (1952), as amended (Supp. 1975)).
93. 420 Pa. at 102 n.2, 216 A.2d at 320 n.2. Compare Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity
Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130, 145 (1932), wherein it is argued that contribution
should be permitted in all cases where there is joint liability for a tort, whether intended or
not, concerted or unconcerted, successive or concurrent, active or passive negligence.
94. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 10, § 1 at 1.
95. The district court in Newport Air Park, Inc. v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 809 (D.R.I.
1968), rev'd, 419 F.2d 342 (1st Cir. 1969) sought to adopt the Pennsylvania rule, citing its
merits. The circuit court of appeals reversed, on grounds that the court was usurping the
function of the Rhode Island legislature by seeking to redefine contribution rights against a
negligent employer. The contribution statute had been interpreted previously to bar any
recovery from an employer, and the court's adoption of a rule to the contrary was termed
"impermissible ad hoc legislation." 419 F.2d at 345.
96. Newport Air Park, Inc. v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 809, 815 (D.R.I. 1968).
"[TIhe distortions of our old fashioned fault concepts that have been thought advisable
for reasons of social policy are exclusively limited to providing an assured recovery for the
injured person; they have never gone on . . . to change the rules on how the ultimate burden
was borne." 2A LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 10, § 71.10 at 14-1.
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The one shortcoming of the Pennsylvania rule is its seemingly
arbitrary limitation of the amount that the third party can recover
against the employer under contribution rules. Assume, for exam-
ple, that an employee's product liability suit against a manufac-
turer results in an $800,000 verdict 7 in favor of the employee. The
employer is sued for contribution on grounds that his neglect
equally contributed to the injury. Under the present workmen's
compensation statute, an employer pays a totally disabled worker
a maximum of two-thirds of the state's "average weekly wage," plus
his medical costs. Assuming medical bills of $50,000 and a lost-
wages compensation of 2/3 ($187 per week) for 20 years, the work-
men's compensation award is $50,000 + $129,523.68 or $179,523.68.
The compensation payable by the employer is a mere 22% of the
total verdict of $800,000, although his equitable share would have
been 50% ($400,000). The manufacturer is liable for $620,477
($800,000 less the workmen's compensation paid). This represents
a sizeable increase over his equitable share of $400,000. In an era
when product liability verdicts are taxing many small businesses
almost beyond their capacity to exist, the difference between paying
the "lion's share" and a "fair share" of the verdict when the em-
ployer is equally negligent may be the difference between bank-
ruptcy and solvency.
It has been suggested that the fairest loss distribution system is
in fact "a system which leads to an equitable division of the whole
loss, according to the degree of culpability of the parties."98 A natu-
ral apportionment scheme is that of the comparative negligence
statutes, which assess economic liability on the basis of the relative
degree of fault appraised to exist on the part of each tortfeasor. A
similar apportionment is also commonly made under existing con-
tribution statutes to assess liability among joint tortfeasors. Few
states, however, have adopted the Pennsylvania rule, let alone at-
tempted to equalize the scales between negligent employer and
third-party tortfeasor via a scheme for distribution of loss based on
97. The sum of $800,000 is no longer a shockingly high figure in the realm of products
liability verdicts. See, e.g., Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 I1. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636
(1969), aff'd, 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970) (exploding drain solvent-930,000). The
tort verdict, of course, encompasses pain and suffering, impairment of learning capacity, lost
wages and sundry collateral actions as loss of consortium or emotional distress.
98. Riesenfeld, Workmen's Compensation and Other Social Legislation: The Shadow of
Stone Tablets, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 207, 217 (1965).
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comparative culpability."9 In spite of the monumental rectification
of the current inequitable system that a comparative-culpability
distribution mechanism could effect, its acceptance seems virtually
foreclosed by courts' needlessly restrictive interpretations of work-
men's compensation and contribution statutes.'"' Some device
99. There appears to be a double compensation if the employee is allowed to recover
medical costs and partial wage loss from both the employer under statute and the third party
tortfeasor via lawsuit. Allocation of the "windfall" of double compensation to the employee
has raised as much clamor as its allocation to the third party by the subtraction of the amount
paid by the employer under workmen's compensation from the amount due from the third
party tortfeasor. The third party arguably receives an unfair profit when the payment of the
innocent employer's statutory liability reduces his bill to the plaintiff. One statute reduces
the third party award by the workmen's compensation amount to prevent double recovery
by the employee. See CAL. LABOR CODE ANN. § 3601(a)(3) (1971).
In Chamberlain v. Carborundum Co., [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH PROD. LIAB. REP.
'17014 (3d Cir. 1973), a verdict of $103,100 was entered against the manufacturer of a grinding
wheel which had shattered, killing plaintiff's decedent. Carborundum sued as a third party
defendant decedent's employer, Berwind Railway Service Co., for negligence in failing to put
a guard on the machine. The jury found against the employer on the third party complaint,
but the court limited the employer's liability to a sum not to exceed its workmen's compensa-
tion liability to decedent. As between manufacturer and employer, the suit for contribution
resulted in an obligation by employer to pay its workmen's compensation share, for total
fulfillment of its contributions obligation. As to plaintiff, the third party judgment reduced
the damage award of $103,100 due from manufacturer by the workmen's compensation
amount paid by employer, by allowing employer to set that amount off against its contribu-
tion obligation. Plaintiff and employer Berwind both moved to amend the verdict on grounds
that there could be no contribution between a strictly-liable manufacturer and a statutorily-
liable employer. The circuit court of appeals upheld the trial court's denial of the motion,
expressly overruling prior decisions requiring that the parties have pari delicto status before
contribution was available. The decision had the effect of denying to plaintiff the windfall of
double compensation from a recovery of both a workmen's compensation claim and the full
amount of the verdict under strict liability theories.
100 The refusal to allow any contribution from a negligent employer has been justified
on grounds that it would be statutorily impermissible to resurrect a liability over and above
that exclusively imposed by a workmen's compensation statute. A similar argument limits
the amount available from the employer, when contribution is permitted to the workmen's
compensation ceiling, on the theory that the employer would otherwise be deprived of the
benefit of his bargain. As to these arguments, workmen's compensation, in retrospect, is a
bad bargain both for the injured worker and the third party joint tortfeasor. See generally
TIIE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS (1972).
The majority of courts rigidly construe contribution statutes, thus denying the employer's
liability "in tort" which would support the third party's right to contribution on his part.
Contribution is also barred on grounds that a statutorily liable employer and a strictly-liable
manufacturer are not parties in aequali jure and do not share pari delicto status since their
liabilities have different sources at law. The requirement of pari delicto status is an illogical
relic of the early rule that both contributing defendants had to be of equal fault before the
court could apportion contribution liability between them. Other interpretations restrict
contribution to suits where some "common liability" to a plaintiff on the part of defendants
can be identified, rather than "common tortious conduct." Application of the contribution
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should be available to balance the competing interests of the em-
ployer and the manufacturer with a more equitable result. Uncer-
tainty as to how a just apportionment based on relative degrees of
fault might be obtained has led to what one commentator calls "a
luxuriant jungle growth of court decisions."'"' Yet one court has
successfully resolved "the most evenly-balanced controversy" in a
landmark decision, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.,' °0 which pays due
regard to the stone tablets of both workmen's compensation and
contribution statutes while serving the best interests of justice.
IV. CHANGING THE RULE ON How THE ULTIMATE BURDEN Is TO BE
BORNE
In Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., °3 an employee of a milling company
died as a result of exposure to methyl bromide gas while cleaning a
grain storage bin that had just been fumigated. The fumigant had
been manufactured by Dow Chemical Company. The decedent's
estate sued Dow alleging that a failure to properly label the chemi-
cal was the cause of decedent's harm. Dow filed a third-party com-
plaint for indemnification against the employer. The employer
moved to dismiss the third party complaint on grounds that it was
immune from such suit under the New York workmen's compensa-
tion law,'0 4 which provided that an action could not be brought
against an employer for damages sustained by an employee either
by the employee himself "or anyone else otherwise entitled to re-
cover damages." The trial court denied the motion, and the em-
ployer appealed. The appellate division of the supreme court re-
statute in several jurisdictions is dependent on a finding of some common right or interest
on plaintiff's part against each of those who would be denominated jiint tortfeasors. For
example, the condition to contribution in Louisiana is a finding that the defendants are
"solidarily" liable to plaintiff. "Solidarily" is a term of civil law origin denoting a common
right or interest, parallel to the joint and several obligation of the common law. In Washington
v. Degelos, 312 So. 2d 918 (La. 1975), an employee sued for injuries caused by a malfunction-
ing electric tractor-type loader. Suit was filed against the officers of the corporation and the
repairer of the loader. The court interpreted the contribution statute to mean that if the
omission of the officers and the negligent repair of the machine were concurrent proximate
causes of the plaintiff's injury the defendants would be solidarily liable, and contribution
would be permitted.
101. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 10, § 59.20 at 10-266.
102. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
103. Id.
104. N.Y. WORKMEN'S COmP. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1965).
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versed and granted the motion, whereupon Dow appealed. At issue
was Dow's right to recover indemnification damages from a negli-
gent employer for breach of a duty which the employer allegedly
owed. Building upon existing New York case law and drawing heav-
ily on considerations of social policy, the New York Court of Appeals
reinstated the order granting Dow the right to apportionment of
liability, based on the relative responsibility of the parties.
Previously, New York had adhered to the active-passive negli-
gence test to determine when indemnification would be permit-
ted'0 5-an actively negligent defendant, because his fault was the
greater, was deemed unable to recoup his losses from other defen-
dants only passively negligent.' The problem with the active-
passive test was its conclusion of total victory in the form of indem-
nification in favor of the passively negligent party against the ac-
tively negligent one. Often the fault was not easily divisible into the
"all or nothing" proportions required under the active-passive test.
Only when the factual disparity between the delinquencies of the
defendants was so great that indemnity should follow was the
active-passive distinction viable.
The right of a passively negligent party to indemnity against an
employer, insulated from common law suit by a workmen's compen-
sation statute, had been established in New York in Westchester
Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp. 07 Building
upon this case, the court in Dole recognized that a decisive differ-
ence existed between an employee's cause of action against his em-
105. See McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge, 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463 (1952).
106. For example, in Lauro v. All Boro Gas Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH PROD.
LIAR. REP. 115976 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968), where an injured workman obtained judgment against
a seller and a distributor of a propane tank which had exploded when it was dropped due to
the absence of a safety cover on the valve, ultimate responsibility was placed on the actively-
negligent distributor. The distributor could have installed a safety cover, but the seller had
merely placed the original order with the distributor and had never had possession of the
tank. The passively-negligent seller was entitled to indemnification from the actively-
negligent distributor.
See also Caruloff v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 445 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1971)
(manufacturer's active negligence in failing to warn of the danger of a certain television repair
procedure defeated its claim for indemnity); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Motors Corp.,
11970-1973 Transfer Binderl CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 6452 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970) (insurance
carrier denied indemnification from the manufacturer of its insured's auto, because the in-
sured driver was actively negligent in failing to avoid the accident). When both parties are
equally negligent, neither cross-claim for indemnity will be allowed. Sylvestri v. Warner &
Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968).
107. 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938).
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ployer and a third party's cause of action against an employer for
breach of an independent duty or obligation owed that third party.
The plaintiff-employee's suit was in tort against defendant-
manufacturer Dow. While the plaintiff-employee would normally
have been barred from any recovery in excess of the workmen's
compensation amount against his third-party defendant employer,
Dow's cause of action against the employer was distinguishable
therefrom and, as such, was not extinguished by the exclusive rem-
edy provision of the workmen's compensation statute. Dow's third-
party cause of action, which was sustained, resulted in an
apportionment of the damages flowing from Dow's obligation to pay
the employee under the primary suit. °0
In a carefully-considered analysis of the social policy reasons
mandating such a change, the court surveyed the arguments for a
broader view of the apportionment of responsibility among tortfea-
sors that had been offered in other jurisdictions, focusing upon the
following argument:
The present system runs counter to tort policy goals of deter-
rence, equitable loss sharing by all the wrongdoers, effective
loss distribution over a large segment of society, and rapid
compensation of the plaintiff-as well as the judicial economy
interest in settling all matters arising out of the same transac-
tion in one proceeding.' °0
108. The procedural difficulties involved in a complex lawsuit of this nature could be
resolved by instructing the jury to consider Dow's complaint for indemnification against
third-party defendant employer only if Dow were found liable on the employee's original
cause of action. If such a finding were made, the jury could apportion the liability dependent
on the proportion of blame found against the third-party defendant. The ultimate resolution
of the third-party complaint for indemnification might be a full indemnification, or an appor-
tionment of liability based on relative fault.
The last resort of a third-party employer would be a request for a limitation of his liability
only up to the amount for which he would be liable under the workmen's compensation
statute (comparable to the Pennsylvania rule). A recognition of the basic difference in the
causes of action against the employer by defendant Dow and by the employee commands the
corresponding result that no such limitation will be allowed in a verdict based upon Dow's
separate cause of action. The court of appeals found arbitrary and unpersuasive the Pennsyl-
vania rule limiting the amount recoverable by a third party to the amount payable by the
employer as a workmen's compensation claim, 30 N.Y.2d at 152, 282 N.E.2d at 294, 331
N.Y.S.2d at 390-91, thus reaffirming its disavowal of the doctrine in Westchester Lighting
Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y. 175, 176, 15 N.E.2d 567, 568 (1938).
One commentator, Larson, Workmen's Compensation: Third Party's Action over Against
Em plover, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 351, 364 (1970), has stated that the limitation seems to have
had its origin not in judicial capriciousness but in the interest in preserving the ceiling on
employer's contribution which was the quid pro quo for expanded employer liability.
109. Comment, Contribution and Indemnity in California, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 490, 516
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Recognizing the injustice resulting from use of the active-passive
test to determine liability, the New York Court of Appeals aban-
doned that test and concluded that the "[flight to apportionment
of liability . . . as among parties involved together in causing dam-
age by negligence, should rest on [the] relative responsibility [of
the parties] . ..."110
The Dole decision thus revolutionized the apportionment of dam-
ages among defendants whose actions contribute to bring about a
single harm. By characterizing the suit by Dow against the third-
party employer as one for indemnification rather than for contribu-
tion, the court in Dole neatly avoided the necessity of charting a
course through the tortuous channels of existing contribution deci-
sions. Rather than assault the threshold issue of whether to allow
the employer who cannot be designated a tortfeasor to be sued for
apportionment of damages in the nature of contribution, the court
recognized a new basis of liability in the independent obligation
owed the third party by the employer. This allows a far more pre-
dictable and just result than the former reliance upon the initial
characterization of the cause of action between the parties as one
for indemnity vis a vis one for contribution.
The relative loss apportionment technique of Dole could be used
with great success to unravel the complex relationships between
negligent employers and manufacturers in product liability cases.
Should the manufacturer be held responsible for damages to an
injured employee, the jury could consider the issue of whether the
employer's conduct had been a substantial factor in bringing about
harm to the employee. The total verdict for the employee would be
paid by both the manufacturer and the employer according to the
relative amounts of "fault" assessed against each. The employer
would be protected from liability in excess of the workmen's com-
pensation limits only if the jury found his neglect to be inconsequen-
tial as compared to the conduct of the manufacturer."' The jury, of
course, could not consider the question unless the manufacturer had
(1969), quoted in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 150, 282 N.E.2d 288, 293, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382, 389 (1972).
110. 30 N.Y.2d at 150, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92.
111. The most equitable solution may leave both parties wishing the law could have been
a little more equitable to their particular side. "Thus was justice ever ridiculed in Rome: such
be the double verdict here, which send away both parties to a suit not puffed up, nor cast
down . . . .For each a crumb of right, for neither, the entire loaf." R. BROWNING, THE RING
ANI 'rTHE BOOK 747, 752 (1874).
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been found strictly liable, for the right of the manufacturer to in-
demnification from the employer is conditioned upon a breach of
the employer's obligation which has resulted in some harm to the
manufacturer. Relative fault is of great importance in situations
where an employer has disobeyed a safety statute or a manufac-
turer's warning or has failed to install a safety device. The possibil-
ity of being held liable proportionate to one's relative fault has the
potential to deter socially irresponsible conduct on the part of an
employer unmatched by any of the current loss distribution mecha-
nisms. Indeed, the abysmal failure of both the workmen's compen-
sation statutes and the contribution statutes to discourage an em-
ployer's misconduct by means of effective economic sanctions is one
of the paramount criticisms leveled at the existing system. Even if
the only policy goal effectuated by relative loss apportionment were
to be that of deterrence, the adoption of the Dole rule would serve
justice well.
The Dole rule would also remedy the inequitable distribution of
losses to a single level of enterprise. Relative loss apportionment
ensures that each enterprise within the risk allocation model will
absorb only its fair share of the costs of an industrial accident. The
situations where the manufacturer is forced out of business because
he finds himself unable to distribute the costs of industrial injury
quickly enough to the remainder of society should also be substan-
tially diminished.
The Dole rule may seem at first glance to be complex in applica-
tion when the right of an injured employee to compensation from
both employer and tort defendant are considered. Assume that in
the previously mentioned hypothetical involving a press manufac-
turer, the manufacturer loses an $800,000 product liability verdict
to a plaintiff-employee in a jurisdiction recognizing relative loss
apportionment. In a third-party suit for apportionment of the loss,
the employer's fault is adjudged to be 50 per cent. The employer's
share of the loss as to the manufacturer is $400,000, founded on a
cause of action separate from the employer's liability to the em-
ployee under workmen's compensation in the amount of $178,000.
While the mechanics of transferring the funds may be complex, the
interests of all parties are served if the plaintiff is awarded
$800,000-comprising $400,000 from the manufacturer's own funds;
$178,000 from the workmen's compensation carrier; and $222,000
from the manufacturer received from the employer under loss ap-
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portionment. The plaintiff is fully compensated for his loss by re-
ceipt of the $800,000. The manufacturer is liable for the entire ver-
dict, but can take solace in the forced "contribution" by the em-
ployer which reduces his actual burden to $400,000, one appropriate
under the relative loss determination by the jury. The employer
pays plaintiff $178,000 under workmen's compensation and trans-
fers to manufacturer $222,000 for distribution to plaintiff. The
plaintiff should not be heard to complain that he has lost the addi-
tional wifidfall of $178,000 that is sometimes available under strict
indemnity statutes. If the employee's suit against the manufacturer
is unsuccessful, the employer cannot be sued for an independent
implied-indemnity obligation to the manufacturer because the
manufacturer has incurred no loss as a result of any action taken
by the employer. The exclusive remedy provision of workmen's com-
pensation limits the employer's loss to the compensation claim.
From the parties' viewpoints, certain inequities remain despite
Dole's relative-fault apportionment. If an employer has been negli-
gent but a third party tortfeasor is adjudged blameless, the em-
ployer still escapes all but his statutory compensation liabil-
ity-much as justice might seem to be contravened from the injured
employee's view. Moreover, allowing an employer's compensation
claim to be set off against the amount payable to the manufacturer
for the plaintiff's use is a permutation of the collateral source rule
that is certain to raise a cry from savants of restitution law. Further,
subtracting the windfall of double compensation from the plaintiff
in the interest of simplifying the mechanics of recovery over may
appear to allow the wrongdoer to profit from his wrong. But a careful
weighing of these disadvantages of a Dole apportionment against
the overwhelming improvements it is capable of fostering within the
loss distribution system shows it to be by far the most equitable of
the loss apportionment mechanisms. The Dole court is light-years
ahead of other courts that insist upon determining loss apportion-
ment by the "shadows of the stone tablets of precedent""' or by
anachronistic doctrines untempered by any sensitivity to the needs
of a dynamic industrial society.
112. "We have come a long way from the time when courts were on guard to keep statutes
in their place, in the stone tablets of precedent. For a good many years now legislatures have
been erecting some formidable stone tablets of their own .... " Traynor, Comments on
Courts and Lawmaking in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW 48 (Paulsen ed. 1959).
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V. A PROGNOSIS: FROM TuFT TO TuFT ACROSS THE MORASS?. 3
A recognition of the need for change in the current contribution
system leads to the question of how the desired improvement might
be effected. The primary obstacle to the adoption of relative-fault
apportionment is the case law of the jurisdictions, especially that
dealing with the construction of the contribution statutes and the
workmen's compensation acts. The narrow definition of "tortfeasor"
precludes classification of the employer as such a party so as to visit
contribution liability upon him under the relevant statutes. The
tendency to construe workmen's compensation statutes so as to bar
all suits against an employer arising from an injury to an employee
covered by workmen's compensation also effectively halts the ex-
pansion of the present contribution system to a relative fault sys-
tem. If the immunity of an employer is considered to go only to his
tort liability to his employee, and not to a third party suit sounding
in tort, the difficulty is resolved.
One theory for allowing relative-fault apportionment hinges on
the denomination of the employer under existing contribution stat-
utes. A determination that the contribution laws and the indemnity
laws of a jurisdiction are flexible enough to permit an interchangea-
ble appellation to the suit would permit the entire suit to proceed
as an indemnity action. Characterization of the suit as one for in-
demnity of course evades the purview of the contribution statute in
toto.
Another theory for allowing relative-fault apportionment is
founded on the recognition of a new right enforceable on behalf of a
third party plaintiff against a third party defendant employer. The
right can be either that of an implied indemnification by an em-
ployer for the benefit of any party who pays a judgment for an injury
in which the employer's tortious conduct was a "substantial factor,"
or an implied indemnification founded on some contractual rela-
tionship between the parties. The tort loss indemnification is justifi-
able on equitable principles and on the same general considerations
that first motivated the adoption of the contribution statutes-that
each party should pay his fair share of the loss.
Any of the aforementioned theories is legally sufficient to permit
113. "For the resolution of difficult controversies, the case-by-case decision method does
no more than carry us from tuft to tuft across the morass." The writer has heard this attrib-
uted to Justice Holmes, but has been unable to trace its origin.
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a jurisdiction to adopt relative-fault apportionment in contribution
cases. The stumbling block is more often that of overcoming the
resistance to a change that may radically restructure a key segment
of case law. Until courts resolve to attack the problem directly as
the Dole court did, the morass of contribution-indemnity-exclusive
remedy case law will continue to frustrate the dispensation of justice
in actions where an employer and a third party both contribute in
substantial ways to an employee's injury.
Pennsylvania, of all jurisdictions, is most capable of restructuring
its contribution laws to reflect the new equity of relative fault appor-
tionment. The elimination of the stone tablet of pari delicto status
in Chamberlain v. Carborundum Co. "4 allows a negligent employer
to be joined with a strictly-liable defendant for purposes of assess-
ing fault under a contribution statute. That Pennsylvania decision
has already laid the groundwork for a liberal interpretation of the
rule allowing the employer to be denominated a joint tortfeasor for
purposes of assessment of contribution, making unnecessary an eva-
sion of the statute by calling the suit one for indemnity. A long line
of Pennsylvania cases establishes the right of a third party to sue
an employer for contribution, so long as the amount the employer
is eventually asked to pay under contribution does not exceed his
statutory workmen's compensation liability."5 This limitation on
the amount of contribution is arbitrary and illogical if one accepts
the Dole hypothesis that in reality the contribution rests upon an
independent right of indemnification from the employer to the third
party, a right not delimited by the compensation ceiling in the
employer-employee nexus. A recognition of this independent indem-
nification right would render unsupportable the present restrictive
Pennsylvania rule of loss apportionment in employer contribution
cases. While such a change will find no favor with employers, the
114. 11973-1975 Transfer Binderl CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 7014 (3d Cir. 1973). See note
99 supra.
115. E.g., the Chamberlain court expressly overruled the prior line of cases represented
by Fenton v. McCrory Corp., 47 F.R.D. 260 (W.D. Pa. 1969), which held that a tortfeasor
liable under negligence theories could not be joined for contribution purposes with one whdse
liability flowed from § 402A strict liability. The parties were held not to be "in pari delicto,"
which was a requirement for status as joint tortfeasors under the contribution statute. Defen-
dant was liable for selling a rubber-tipped toy arrow on which the rubber "safety" tip did
not prevent the shaft of the arrow from penetrating through to injure plaintiff's eye. The seller
sued a playmate as a third party defendant on the theory that the playmate's negligence was
a contributing cause of plaintiff's injury for which defendant was liable under § 402A.
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fairer treatment which would be accorded all parties under a rela-
tive fault apportionment is compelling reason to replace the Penn-
sylvania rule. An expanded right of contribution against the em-
ployer on behalf of the third party manufacturer in the industrial
accident cases goes far toward serving justice. And justice, in the
words of Daniel Webster, "is the great interest of man on earth.""'
116. D. WEBSTER, ON MR. JUSTICE STORY (1845), quoted in J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 467 (8th ed. 1882).

